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Natural Law Ethics: A Comparison of the Theravāda and Thomistic Traditions 
 
 
David Lantigua 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This thesis investigates the topic of natural law in the Theravāda and Thomistic 
traditions by utilizing the methodology of comparative religious ethics. Approaches to the 
method such as ethical formalism, ethical naturalism, and narrative ethics are assessed 
with the author opting for a multidimensional approach that is religious and ethical. This 
multidimensional approach, as defined by William Schweiker, conducts natural law 
inquiry from a hermeneutical standpoint of moral diversity and democratic pluralism. 
 The hermeneutical standpoint warrants a historicizing of natural law ethics that is 
compatible with modern secularity instead of a classicist metaphysical worldview. To 
achieve this task, the thought of moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre and Jewish 
theologian David Novak is used to formulate a concept of a natural law tradition. Three 
normative features define the natural law traditions in question: rationality as tradition-
constituted, revelation as a historical phenomenon, and natural law as a cultural construct 
that is both comparative and ontological. 
The central claim of this thesis is that the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions 
provide a similar conceptual apparatus for rational discourse that can locate ethical 
commonalities and respect differences across traditions. The commonality between 
iii 
traditions is secured in natural law ethics because these traditions adhere to a constitutive 
truth that is the objective ground of all truths and of nature which designates a shared 
humanity. On the other hand, these natural law traditions are able to at least respect 
difference because they recognize the autonomy of other traditions outside of and pre-
existing their own. Natural law ethics in these religious traditions therefore avoids the 
ethical challenges of relativism and authoritarianism.  
Both traditions define a concept of “nature” with a proper teleological orientation 
for the moral life. “Nature” is an open category in these traditions that can never be fully 
defined. This demonstrates how these natural law traditions avoid ontological violence. 
The overall claim is that natural law ethics, which are evident in the Theravāda and 
Thomistic traditions, offer something essential to a pluralistic secular democracy: an 
unconditioned view of human dignity that protects inalienable rights because it is secured 
by a higher law than civil laws. 
 
 
iv 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
 
AN  Anguttara Nikāya 
Dh  Dhammapada (The Path of Truth) 
DN  Digha Nikāya 
DQChar Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Virtues: On Charity 
DQTruth Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth 
DQVirtGen Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Virtues: On the Virtues in 
General 
Mil  Milindapañha (The Questions of King Milinda) 
MN  Majjhima Nikāya 
NE  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 
SN  Samyutta Nikāya 
ST  Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae 
VS  John Paul II, Veritatis splendor (The Splendor of Truth) 
 
v 
                                                
 
 
 
Introduction: Ethics in a World of Neighbors 
 
 
Philosophers… have concerned themselves with morality as a science: they 
wanted to furnish the rational ground of morality – and every philosopher 
hitherto has believed he has furnished this rational ground; morality itself, 
however, was taken as ‘given’. […] they did not so much as catch sight of the real 
problems of morality—for these come into view only if we compare many 
moralities.1
  
Friedrich Nietzsche did catch sight of some of the “real problems” of morality via 
his genealogical critique and sweeping comparison of modernity and the ancients. He 
uncovered the traps of foundationalist certainties and disabused many philosophical 
students of the Enlightenment who claimed to be past “God” and “religion” that their 
science and rationalism were mere masks disguising a will to power. Their claims to truth 
based on facts were no more legitimate than Christianity’s metaphysical claims derived 
from faith.  
Although Nietzsche did compare many moralities, he still did not escape the 
modernist tendency and Enlightenment security of reducing all phenomena to a single 
explanation. Morality was, for him, “an assessment and ranking of human drives and 
actions.” 2 Moral diversity, therefore, was an inevitable outcome because “the conditions 
of the survival of one community have been very different from the conditions of another 
 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil §186, in A Nietzsche Reader, trans. R. J. Hollingdale 
(England: Penguin Books, 2003), 104-105. 
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science §116, in Existentialism: Basic Writings, 2nd ed., Charles Guignon 
and Derk Pereboom, eds. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001), 138. 
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community.”3 In other words, morality is seen as nothing more than the arbitrary 
convention of wills and drives competing for survival and power in a particular historical 
situation. Nietzsche, in this regard, was no different than his Enlightenment predecessors 
by locating a single ground of morality. Not a rational ground to morality, but rather, an 
irrational one. 
Nietzsche’s anti-foundationalist legacy and distaste for rational morality has lived 
on under the gamut of much “postmodern” thinking. Without a language of rationality for 
honest communication, an unbridgeable gap lay between discourse partners according to 
many thinkers captivated by the postmodern imagination. This outlook has welcomed the 
arrival of the postmodern stranger who is radically other. The alterity of the other is so 
profound that we are unsure and perhaps even unable to adjudicate whether or not this 
stranger is hostile or friendly, demonic or divine.4 For ethics, the issue of alterity and 
otherness is an important and necessary one, but of equal importance is the issue of 
commonality and sameness. Meeting the postmodern stranger who is radically different 
than us is not our aim. Instead, our aim is to meet our global neighbor who is never too 
far to be a stranger and yet not necessarily close enough to be family. It is within this 
category of the neighbor who is both different and common that our investigation of 
ethics shall proceed. 
I echo Nietzsche’s position that we can only catch sight of the real problems of 
morality by way of comparison. Our moral situation demands that we confront the reality 
that we are living in a pluralistic age with diverse moralities. Everyday across the globe 
people are taking life-threatening stands on moral positions. Some do so to the point of 
 
3 Ibid. 
4 See Richard Kearney, Strangers, Gods, and Monsters (New York: Routledge, 2003), Chapters 3 and 4. 
vii 
taking the lives of the enemy to protect a cause while others do so by letting themselves 
die in order to redeem one. Comparing moralities or ethics is the underlying issue in this 
investigation. This task of comparing ethics under the theme of neighborliness can yield 
both our commonalities and differences. The method of comparing ethics will not be 
through the lens of moral philosophy but of religious ethics.  
For this investigation, I compare the religious ethics of Buddhism and 
Christianity. I concentrate specifically on the issue of natural law in these religions as 
articulated by the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions. My thesis is that these natural law 
traditions contain a similar conceptual apparatus for ethical thinking across traditions. 
These natural law traditions fit our category of neighborliness in that they are able to 
locate any “overlapping” with other traditions, but also locate and respect differences. 
The commonality between persons is secured in natural law ethics because these 
traditions adhere to an ultimate truth that is the objective ground of all truths and of 
nature thus designating a shared humanity. On the other hand, these natural law traditions 
are able to at least respect difference because they recognize the autonomy of other 
traditions outside of and pre-existing their own. The natural law ethics of these religious 
traditions can therefore avoid the ethical challenges of relativism and authoritarianism. 
My overall claim is that natural law ethics offer something essential to a pluralistic 
secular democracy: an unconditioned view of human dignity that can protect inalienable 
rights because it is secured by a higher law than civil laws. 
 The method of inquiring about natural law in the Theravāda and Thomistic 
traditions will be through comparative religious ethics. Chapter 1 begins by situating the 
field of comparative religious ethics within the academic study of religion. This will 
viii 
introduce us to two important approaches for the development of this field, the historical-
empiricist approach of “ethical naturalism” by Robin Lovin and Frank Reynolds and the 
ethical formalist or “deep structure” approach by Ronald Green. The approaches used in 
these thinkers set the parameters that launched the debate for the emergent field of 
comparative religious ethics. Although commendable for their originality and depth, the 
deep structure approach by Green and the ethical naturalism approach by Lovin and 
Reynolds were subject to the dangers of easy translatability and incommensurability. In 
other words, the approaches have a tendency to overemphasize sameness or difference. 
These challenges of easy translatability and incommensurability to the field of 
comparative religious ethics cannot go unaddressed. As Nietzsche pointed out, there is a 
problem in locating a single model of rationality and a single ground, especially within 
the pluralistic ethos of a secular democracy. This conceit of Enlightenment thinking that 
has a tendency to inadequately address moral diversity has been associated with Green’s 
approach. There is a totalizing tendency in this approach that locates a single ground and 
method of rationality that Green refers to as the deep structure.  
On the other hand, Nietzsche’s reactionary account of morality as irrational is far 
less appealing. Contra Nietzsche, I argue that the problem for ethics is not in using a 
language of rationality or locating its ground. To reject rationality in toto is an invitation 
to the extreme relativism of the skeptic. Therefore, we are not attempting to uncover a 
single rational ground, but rather, multiple grounds of rationality. The work of Lovin and 
Reynolds does just this by identifying various rationalities within single traditions. 
Although this approach stresses moral differences, it does so at the expense of comparing 
rationalities and moralities across traditions. In a pluralistic age threatened by moral 
ix 
relativism, the approach of ethical naturalism seems unable to sufficiently address this 
problem because its primary aim is to describe the uniqueness of each tradition, not 
compare traditions. 
 The issue of moral diversity and the challenges of relativism and totalism provide 
the context in which the narrative approach of Darrell Fasching and Dell deChant and the 
multidimensional approach of William Schweiker are framed. These two approaches 
have been classified under the “hermeneutical-dialogical” paradigm of doing comparative 
religious ethics. These authors never cease to think about religious ethics apart from the 
hermeneutical standpoint of moral diversity and pluralism, which I am adopting. 
Attempting to bridge religious worlds in order to promote common goods and religious 
humanism belongs to the comparative and constructive tasks employed by these authors. 
I also take up these tasks and specifically utilize Schweiker’s multidimensional model for 
natural law inquiry. 
 A multidimensional approach to natural law aims for scope, not autonomy. That is 
to say, we are attempting to retrieve, in some part, the rich ethical complexity of these 
natural law traditions without claiming to have an all-embracing methodological solution. 
The various dimensions that will be used to retrieve these traditions include normative, 
descriptive, fundamental, practical, and metaethical. All of these dimensions fit into our 
inquiry in some way, with the normative dimension standing out as the most central 
given our context of moral diversity and the threat of normlessness. Furthermore, this 
approach to natural law ethics considers the duty of a scholar to be religious and ethical. 
This means that the traditional strict boundaries between theology and philosophy, church 
and academy, religion and state, and prescription and description will not be present. 
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Instead, the relationship between disciplines and conceptual spaces is a fluid one that will 
strive to be mutually enriching rather than antagonistic. 
Our inquiry into natural law from a hermeneutical standpoint of moral diversity 
and pluralism begins with formulating a concept of a natural law tradition. That is my 
concern in chapter 2. The purpose of this chapter is to set the parameters of what we are 
looking for in the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions. The concept of a natural law 
tradition will show us how truth, law, and authority in these traditions function in similar 
ways. For this task, I turn to the work of moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre and 
Jewish theologian David Novak. These thinkers will help us define three normative 
features of a natural law tradition: rationality as tradition-constituted; revelation as a 
historical phenomenon; and natural law as a cultural construct that is both comparative 
and ontological. These features contribute to the project of historicizing natural law 
without denying a tradition’s claims to ultimate truth. 
Chapter 3 will explicitly defend the thesis of this investigation: that the natural 
law traditions in question show analogous structures of rational ethical discourse. The 
Theravāda and Thomistic traditions delineate categories of natural law discourse that 
recognizes the autonomy and limits of other traditions and the need for special insight 
and revelation for moral development and liberation. I will use the categories of 
“general” and “special” to distinguish these modes of discourse across traditions and 
within one’s tradition. The important point is that neither one of these modes of discourse 
is purely isolated from the other. In fact, it is because of the “general” knowledge 
common to all persons that the “special” insight or revelation has any meaningfulness at 
all. 
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Chapter 4 addresses the fundamental dimension of our inquiry, the issues of 
ontology and ethics. The concept of “nature” is necessary to any natural law thinking, and 
I consider how these traditions define the term. But if nature is fully defined then an 
account commits ontological violence. These natural law traditions, I claim, avoid 
ontological violence by locating an indefinable or unconditional dimension of human 
existence that is constituted by an ultimate truth. I claim that the way a religious 
practitioner of these traditions is able to understand this truth is by pursuing the 
hypergood. The term hypergood denotes an ethical category. It refers to the specific telos 
or aim that all agents eventually aspire toward thus shaping the moral orientation of a 
person’s life.  
My investigation concludes by suggesting how natural law ethics can and do 
contribute to socio-political matters, especially within a modern democracy such as our 
own. The natural law ethics of the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions contain the 
resources for critically engaging any unjust institution or law on the grounds of higher 
truth and human dignity. These traditions posit a form of rationality whose warrants is 
determined by an ultimate measure or law superceding all temporal and worldly 
standards.  
Lastly, these natural law traditions demonstrate an ethic of neighborliness. This 
ethic illustrates that no matter how wrong or strange another individual’s actions might 
be there is always the possibility of communicating with them in some rational manner. 
That is because they are always within proximity of us in virtue of their humanity. They 
always have the closeness of a neighbor. 
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Chapter One: Situating Comparative Religious Ethics 
 
 
 In 2006, for the first time in the history of the American Academy of Religion, a 
session was organized at the annual meeting for the group on “Comparative Religious 
Ethics.” The session was convened by Aaron Stalnaker, author of the newly acclaimed 
Overcoming Our Evil: Human Nature and Spiritual Exercises in Xunzi and Augustine.1 
Although Stalnaker is not the first to address the topic of religious ethics from a 
comparative method, his work represents the latest attempt to refine the method of 
comparative religious ethics as the field continues to define itself alongside other 
methods in the academic study of religion. 
 In the spirit of Religionswissenschaft pioneers like Max Müller, comparative 
methodology is set upon the premise that “all higher knowledge is acquired by 
comparison.”2 However, the disciplinary boundaries that have been erected in American 
universities to protect the academic study of religion as a social science against anything 
remotely resembling theological reflection was not characteristic of Müller’s humanistic 
science rooted in charitable hermeneutics, reverence, and loyalty to truth when 
investigating the subject of religion.3 Although quite unconventional for his time, Müller 
 
1 Aaron Stalnaker, Overcoming Our Evil: Human Nature and Spiritual Exercises in Xunzi and Augustine, 
(Washington, DC:Georgetown University Press, 2006).  
2 Max Müller, “Plea for a Science of Religion” in  Classical Approaches to the Study of Religion, ed. 
Jacques Waardenburg (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), 91. 
3 Consider the following excerpt from Müller’s lecture: “No one – this I can promise – who attends these 
lectures, be he a Christian or Jew, Hindu or Muslim, shall hear his own way of serving God spoken of 
irreverently. But true reverence does not consist in declaring a subject, because it is dear to us, to be unfit 
for free and honest inquiry: far from it! True reverence is shown in treating every subject, however sacred, 
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conversed with believers in theological circles, especially missionaries, because he saw 
the need for Christians to sympathetically engage other religions by finding a common 
ground.4  
This nineteenth century European “science of religion” method does not 
correspond with the view of contemporary American scholar Donald Wiebe. In the 1988 
article entitled, “Why the Academic Study of Religion?” Wiebe claims that the discipline 
is meant to serve “purely intellectual/scientific reasons and not as instrumental in the 
achievement of religious, cultural, political or other ends.”5 The study of religion is solely 
construed as the pursuit of “objective” knowledge derived from religious phenomena, 
which serves as its data to generalize and establish facts. Wiebe, while invoking the 
message of Max Weber’s “Science as Vocation,” is prey to the modern positivist conceit 
that divorces facts and values. In Wiebe’s view, the study of religion exists purely for the 
sake of theoretical reflection in an isolated academy thus betraying the original intent of 
Religionswissenschaft as public vocation.  
Although none of the approaches to comparative religious ethics considered here 
echo Wiebe’s insularity and scientism, the approaches of Ronald Green, Robin Lovin, 
and Frank Reynolds have been influenced by the aims of modern philosophy and social 
science. Indebted to the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the approach of Ronald 
Green understands that all religions, regardless of time and place, demonstrate a universal 
structure grounded in human reason for responding to moral conflicts. On the other hand, 
 
however dear to us, with perfect confidence; without fear and without favor, with tenderness and love, by 
all means, but, before all, with an unflinching and uncompromising loyalty to truth.”  
4 Müller, 87. 
5 Donald Wiebe, “Why the Academic Study of Religion?” in Theory and Method in the Study of Religion, 
ed. Carl Olson (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003), 39. 
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for Lovin and Reynolds, who take the philosopher David Hume as their cue, comparative 
religious ethics has an empirical-historical task of describing the diverse accounts of 
morality evident across traditions and within single traditions. In their view, reason is 
thoroughly contextualized and understood as the product of the interaction between 
cosmogonic myths, rituals, and feelings. This contrasts radically from Green’s view that 
religions exhibit an ahistorical formal structure of moral reasoning. 
 The appointment of Christian theologian Margaret Miles as president of the 
American Academy of Religion in 1999 represented a new and controversial trend in the 
academic study of religion that hearkens back to the vision of Müller. The initial task of 
her presidential address was to challenge the boundaries between “the study of religion” 
and “theological studies.”6 Miles considered these disciplinary boundaries, which are 
often hostile to each other, as unhelpful. She encouraged members of whatever academic 
standing to work constructively together for the common good. This is only possible by 
bringing “religious studies” as an integrated or mutually beneficial discipline into the 
public sphere.  
Although many of the older scientific methodologists in the academic study of 
religion were unconvinced by Miles’ plea, the field of comparative religious ethics today 
has preserved her spirit of sensitivity toward context. By situating religious ethics within 
a context of the plurality of traditions and diverse moralities the field is engaged with the 
critical resources that allow for the reconstruction of religious traditions in order to 
promote the common good. This is the religious humanism at work in the approaches of 
Darrell Fasching, Dell deChant, and William Schweiker. These approaches are distinct in 
 
6 Margaret Miles, “Becoming Answerable for What We See” in Theory and Method in the Study of 
Religion, ed. Carl Olson (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003), 42. 
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that Fasching and deChant offer a narrative approach and Schweiker offers a 
multidimensional approach, yet both have been classified under the curricular paradigm 
of “hermeneutical-dialogical.”7 They begin from “the fact that we live in a morally and 
religiously pluralistic world.”8 The project of comparative ethics, in their view, is to 
engage the stranger in continual dialogue in an effort to see our world anew through their 
eyes. What is especially important in this paradigm is the hermeneutic task of seeking 
understanding by crossing over into other traditions and bridging religious worlds. This 
hermeneutical paradigm is the standpoint of the approach adopted in this thesis. 
 
Approaches to Comparison 
The methodology of comparative religious ethics owes its genesis to the work of 
two highly original approaches by Frank Reynolds and Robin Lovin, and Ronald Green.9 
My concern here is to give a summary of these approaches and isolate potential strengths 
and weaknesses in their accounts. I also consider the narrative approach adopted by 
Darrell Fasching and Dell deChant that offers an alternative to these approaches. Their 
approach frames the discipline within the context of relativism and ethnocentrism thereby 
taking a hermeneutical standpoint that is used in my investigation of natural law 
traditions. My summary and analysis in no way exhausts the literature on comparative 
religious ethics that has been published over the last couple of decades.10 More recently, 
 
7 Sumner B. Twiss, “Four Paradigms in Teaching Comparative Religious Ethics” in Explorations in Global 
Ethics: Comparative Religious Ethics and Interreligious Dialogue, ed. Sumner B. Twiss and Bruce Grelle 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 16-19. 
8 Ibid., 17 
9 Also consider David Little and Sumner B. Twiss, Comparative Religious Ethics: A New Method, (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1978). Although I am not addressing this approach, it too deserves credit for its 
contribution to the inception of comparative religious ethics. 
10 One example includes the comparative virtues approach by Lee Yearley, Mencius and Aquinas: Theories 
of Virtue and Conceptions of Courage, (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1990). 
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with the inclusion of Stalnaker’s work, comparative religious ethics has developed some 
exciting new approaches to inquiry.11  
In Religion and Moral Reason, Ronald Green argues that he has uncovered a 
“deep structure” to the method of reasoning in religion. He states in his introduction, “I 
wish to show that the most basic processes of religious reasoning are the same 
everywhere and give rise, in understandable ways, to diverse religious expressions.”12 
Green’s approach is to investigate the religions of the world and demonstrate how they 
meet the demands of the deep structure and also how they are different from one another. 
There are essentially three components to this deep structure of religious reasoning: 1) 
the “moral point of view” or impartiality 2) beliefs affirming reality of moral retribution 
and 3) “transmoral” beliefs that suspend moral judgment.13  
Although the deep structure is a priori for all people at all times, Green claims 
that morality across the global religious landscape is not identical in terms of its beliefs, 
rules, and practices. He states that one “must expect this variability of norms.”14 But this 
is not an invitation to ethical relativism. Instead, following the logic of Kant, Green 
asserts that the application of the universal structure to different situations may yield 
different conclusions. Another reason for difference among traditions is that some 
religions have “evolved” more than others. In his treatment of the indigenous religions of 
Confucianism and Daoism in China, Green claims that they failed “to meet the 
conceptual needs dictated by reason’s deep structure” and as a result left a vacuum that 
 
11 See, for example, the conceptual metaphors approach formulated in Edward Slingerland, “Conceptual 
Metaphor Theory as Methodology for Comparative Religion,” Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion 72, no. 1 (March 2004), 1-31 and the special issue, “The Promise of Scriptural Reasoning” in 
Modern Theology 22, no. 3, (July 2006). 
12 Ronald Green, Religion and Moral Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), xii. 
13 Ibid., 3. 
14 Ibid., 9. 
6 
Buddhism could fill.15 What religions can and do share in common are often basic rules 
of morality, which include some of the following: no killing wantonly, no lying or 
breaking promises, giving to the needy, and making reparation for wrongs committed.16 
Of course, certain cultures may promote contrary rules such as the abandoning of elderly 
parents in Eskimo communities. But these anomalies occur for various circumstantial 
reasons, like strenuous environmental conditions. The deep structure never changes; it is 
the “basic method of thinking about choices and making decisions.”17 Therefore, Green 
eliminates the possibility of anything like ethical relativism by appealing to the 
universality of the deep structure and showing how this method can often, though not 
necessarily, result in basic rules of morality.  
The focus of the empirical approach presented in Cosmogony and Ethical Order 
by Robin Lovin and Frank Reynolds is to navigate the contours of the relationship 
between ethics and human-social-cosmic origins in various cultures. Lovin and Reynolds 
recognize the “impulse to link moral orientations to accounts of cosmic origins” in 
traditional cultures and argue that “natural order provides the foundation for much of 
everyday moral thinking.”18 Furthermore, the choice and judgment of moral agents is 
justified by appealing to cosmogonic myths. From the outset, they note that such familiar 
concepts like natural law and principles of order, like Dao or dependent origination 
(paticca-samuppāda), “can be interpreted as systematic expressions of a far more 
widespread belief that truly significant actions recapitulate the primordial cosmogenesis 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 74. 
16 Ibid., 11 
17 Ibid., 9 
18 Robin W. Lovin and Frank E. Reynolds, “In the Beginning,” in Cosmogony and Ethical Order, ed. Robin 
Lovin and Frank Reynolds  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 2. 
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or participate in a pattern established outside of the flux of ordinary events.”19 Thus, the 
authors locate a tradition’s moral resources in the myth of the founding event or 
cosmogony. In their approach, observing mainstream religious and indigenous cultural 
systems in light of each tradition’s cosmogonic myths provides the empirical data. The 
approach of Lovin and Reynolds extends an invitation to the research data provided by 
anthropologists, cultural historians, and historians of religion.20  
Rather than turning to the modern philosophical language of Kant’s ethical 
formalism, Lovin and Reynolds interpret data through an empirically-grounded ethical 
naturalism indebted to David Hume. This is an important shift in methodology that 
allows for the possibility of “diversity of human conceptions of the good life.”21 The 
approach of Lovin and Reynolds begins from the premise that there is a diversity of 
ethical languages both among and within religious traditions. Instead of appealing to a 
view of reason that is pure, undefiled, and the same at all times and places, their account 
of rationality and moral judgment are “complex equilibrations of fact, principle, and 
feeling.”22  
 Comparative Religious Ethics: A Narrative Approach, by Darrell Fasching and 
Dell deChant, provides a model for understanding religious ethics situated in the 
post/modern period defined by the demonic legacies of Auschwitz and Hiroshima.23 In a 
modern, scientific, and industrial age in which techno-bureaucratic rationality has often 
led to a demise of ethical consciousness, Faching and deChant argue that comparative 
 
19 Ibid., 1. 
20 Ibid., 4 
21 Ibid., 9 
22 Ibid., 18 
23 Darrell Fasching and Dell deChant, Comparative Religious Ethics: A Narrative Approach (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2001). 
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religious ethics must confront the challenges posed by genocide, ethnocentrism, 
pluralism, and relativism. The authors undertake the project of forging a cross-cultural 
global religious ethic of human dignity and human liberation rooted in the experience of 
the holy and ancient stories of wrestling with the stranger evident in all the major world 
religions. The process of engaging other traditions through stories amounts to “the way of 
all the earth,” or seeking mutual illumination that is reflected in the “passing over, 
coming back” experiences that have been practiced by twentieth century religious figures 
like Mohandas K. Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Thich Nhat Hanh.  
The approach adopted to achieve the goal of insight between traditions is 
narrative interpretation rooted in the experience of the holy. Thus, the approach is 
fundamentally dialogical and spiritual in its style. For example, Gandhi’s interpretation of 
the Bhagavad-Gītā was deeply shaped by his experience of reading Jesus’ Sermon on the 
Mount. Narrative and emotion, rather than theory and reason, are the sources of ethical 
action in religion. The crucial human faculty that allows this to happen is empathy. 
According to the authors, “reason must follow, not precede emotion.”24 Furthermore, 
spiritual practices such as prayer, fasting, meditation, and study are also essential to the 
moral life of religious practitioners.  
The criteria that Fasching and deChant use to gauge whether or not a story, 
institution, belief, or social group is ethical are the tendencies of the holy and the 
sacred.25 Although both tendencies may exist simultaneously in a social group or person, 
they represent radically different ways of responding to otherness. The holy, illustrated 
by the figure of Socrates and his interior compulsion to question, refers to a personal 
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experience of the infinite and ultimate that promotes dignity and justice for all humans, 
including the stranger. The sacred tendency within societies and humans enforce 
homogeneity at the expense of what is different. Sacred societies tend to designate what 
is different as profane and this can often issue forth in acts of hostility and violence 
toward the stranger. Whereas an ethic of the holy provokes questioning and doubt toward 
the social-moral order, sacred societies protect it by eliminating that which calls it into 
question. 
 
Challenges in Comparative Religious Ethics 
The project of comparative religious ethics, as the narrative approach of Fasching 
and deChant demonstrates, must be able to respond to current moral problems. For these 
thinkers, comparative religious ethics begins with “the serious challenge of cultural and 
ethical relativism.”26 I argue that the both the deep structure and ethical naturalism 
approaches are unable to sufficiently address the challenge of moral diversity and 
relativism. The works of Green, Lovin, and Reynolds are subject to the epistemological 
temptations of modern thinking that tend towards totalism and relativism. 
Totalism refers to the attempt to homogenize all religious and moral traditions 
into a single theory of rationality that can be derived independently of culture and 
context. This moral outlook is identified with Kant’s Enlightenment project of justifying 
morality that appeals to a universal structure of reason. A moral theory such as Green’s 
that strives to demonstrate that all religious traditions reason from a deep structure does 
not sufficiently account for the autonomy of different traditions. Ethical relativism, on the 
other hand, refers to the absence of normative criteria for adjudicating across moral 
 
26 Ibid., 4. 
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traditions. Although not equal to cultural relativism, it is an outlook that has been 
associated with the modern social sciences. By adhering to the descriptive aim of modern 
social science, ethical naturalism is less concerned with contemporary context, or what I 
am referring to as hermeneutical standpoint. Therefore, the constructive task of locating 
norms across traditions that promote the common good is not a facet of their work, and 
this proves to be a limitation of the approach. Let us consider these challenges in more 
detail. 
Kant’s version of reason, pure and undefiled, was cast independent of traditional 
religion and its attendant “superstitions, supernatural dogmas, and cultic practices.”27 
This is the premise of Kant’s “secularization of morality”28 in which the moral law within 
(the good will) is expressive of the universal law (categorical imperative), neither of 
which is grasped through divine revelation but by pure practical reason. As Kant so aptly 
put it, the good will is “determined by reason alone.”29 Religion is useful in so much as it 
remains ‘within the bounds of reason.’ Any of religion’s superficial characteristics are 
only accidental and ultimately of no moral worth to the agent’s rational will.  
Although Green’s account lacks the kind of Enlightenment hostility toward 
traditional religion evident in Kant, Green maintains the view that there is a single 
process of moral and religious reasoning that is the same everywhere.30 We noted that 
moral diversity, according to Green, was the result of historical and environmental 
circumstances because the deep structure is a universal process of human reasoning. 
 
27 John Caputo, On Religion (New York: Routledge, 2001), 48. 
28 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 60. 
29 My emphasis, Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of the Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New 
York: Harper & Row, 1964), 396.8. 
30 Green, xii. 
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Therefore, his response to the problem of ethical relativism is to deny the existence of 
real moral differences because everyone shares the same exact method of formal 
reasoning evident in the deep structure. Green argues that “religions must be viewed as 
evolving rational systems that strain over time to move toward greater sensitivity to 
reason’s agenda.”31 The deep structure presented by Green stands outside of history and 
functions like Kant’s timeless a prioris.  
The deep structure approach totalizes moral and religious diversity by subsuming 
difference into a single account of rationality. Any of religion’s features like beliefs, 
stories, rituals, and doctrines are superficial additions generated by historical and 
environmental contingency. Although Green considers these features to be the source of 
diverse religious expressions, they are “imperfect or ‘ragged’ cultural creations.”32 In 
Green’s account, religions are only different on the surface. What is universal and what is 
unchanging is the formal structure or method of moral decision-making. The problem 
with such a view is that it appears to neglect any “deep” moral differences originating 
from different ultimate truths across religions thus forsaking the possibility of achieving a 
genuine appreciation and respect of otherness. Nor is it able to allow the possibility of 
different accounts of rationality among a plurality of traditions. 
The empirical approach of Lovin and Reynolds avoids a universal account of 
formal reasoning and posits instead particular accounts of rationality that are relative to 
each tradition. In this sense, it resolves the weakness of Green’s approach. The moral life 
of communities lies at the intersection of “worldviews and norms.”33 Instead of viewing 
 
31 Ibid., 82. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Lovin and Reynolds, 30. 
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beliefs, cosmogonic myths, rituals, and feelings, as superficial, Lovin and Reynolds see 
these complex relationships as the empirical ground of rationality that is both natural and 
observable. As such, these cultural artifacts provide the data or content of rationality for 
the historian and anthropologist of religion to study.  
Although the comparative approach of ethical naturalism aims at “empathetic 
understanding and appreciation of cultural-moral differences and similarities,”34 it has a 
shortcoming that should not be overlooked. By aligning itself solely with the descriptive 
aim of the social sciences, this approach seeks no constructive aim of religious humanism 
or critical engagement with the religious traditions. Therefore, the empirical approach of 
ethical naturalism is not weak because it makes untenable claims; it is weak because of 
what it is unable to claim.  
 The authors reject outright any Newtonian solution to the problem of ethical 
relativism that is like the incontrovertible law of gravitation. They seem to deny the 
possibility of something like a moral law precept (e.g. prohibition of rape or torture) 
evident across many traditions that can be used to adjudicate moral differences. When 
moral traditions conflict, the empiricists can only hope, along with the pragmatists, that 
the parties involved will eventually reach agreement or consensus.35 At least with 
Green’s account, there is some way of finding common moral ground in the form of 
precepts across traditions that is worth defending against those who would seek to ignore 
or eliminate them. The problem of moral relativism that Lovin and Reynolds appear to 
shirk must be addressed in comparative religious ethics in order to overcome relativism’s 
 
34 Twiss, 21. 
35 Lovin and Reynolds, 28-29. 
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cheap notion of tolerance that might allow dangerous forms of life to flourish.36 
Moreover, this public concern is in keeping with the Max Müller’s view of religious 
studies that Margaret Miles echoes. 
The weakness of the empirical approach is further illustrated in the sense that the 
authors “set aside the interesting question of what ways of thinking lead to the rejection 
of a prevailing moral system on apparently moral grounds.”37 It is precisely this question 
that cannot be set aside. In avoiding the question, their approach overlooks the issue of 
how traditional myths and worldviews might have perpetuated prejudices and unjust 
structures within society that oppressed certain groups such as women and slaves. On this 
issue, the hermeneutical-dialogical paradigm stands out in its veracity. Critical inquiry of 
religious traditions inherently belongs to discipline of religious studies. It belongs to the 
constructive task in the method of comparative religious ethics. 
 
A Multidimensional Approach to Natural Law  
In The Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics (2006), editor William 
Schweiker suggests an alternative approach to comparative religious ethics that he 
identifies as “a multidimensional account of inquiry”38 This model of inquiry affirms 
certain strengths in the two approaches of ethical formalism and ethical naturalism while 
avoiding some of the shortcomings. As we noted, a weakness of Green’s approach is that 
he attempts “to isolate one formal structure of reason” – the deep structure – to explain 
 
36 See Chapter 2, “Pluralism and Relativism,” in William E. Connolly, Pluralism (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2005).  
37 Lovin and Reynolds, 25.  
38 William Schweiker, “On Religious Ethics,” in The Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics, ed. 
William Schweiker (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 1-15. 
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universal morality and not allow the possibility of different accounts of rationality.39 
Although Green’s formalist approach comes up short in accounting for genuine diversity, 
it succeeds, according to Schweiker, in construing “ethics” as an ‘intellectual construct.’ 
Moreover, Green does make the issue of finding norms and precepts one of his primary 
concerns.  
On the other hand, ethical naturalism begins from the brute fact of moral 
diversity, of which we are adopting. The problem is that Lovin and Reynolds do not 
suggest a way out of relativism.40 The authors are concerned with “worldviews and 
norms” within a tradition but not between traditions. Therefore, very little comparison, if 
any at all, is actually conducted in their approach. Nonetheless, this is also one of the 
great strengths of ethical naturalism. By focusing on a single tradition and describing its 
multiple cosmogonies, beliefs, and practices, the authors do give rich and detailed 
accounts of moral diversity and rationality within traditions.41
A multidimensional approach investigates “the ‘interacting’ dimensions of ethics 
that aim to explicate a religion’s account of and directions for ordering existence and 
conduct in the moral space of life.”42 These include the descriptive, normative, practical, 
fundamental, and metaethical dimensions. I would also add that the multidimensional 
model should not be limited to these nor should we demarcate the dimensions as if they 
were wholly separate from each other. In the edited volume, Schweiker uses this 
multidimensional model to describe the layout and scope of the book. For Schweiker, 
 
39 Ibid., 4. 
40 Ibid., 5. 
41 See, for example, Part III, “Multiple Cosmogonies and Ethical Order” in Lovin and Reynolds. 
42 Schweiker (2006), 5. 
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“Scope, rather than autonomy, will be essential in deciding the validity of claims.”43 In 
this thesis, I will adopt this multidimensional model of inquiry to analyze and suggest the 
scope of natural law ethics within the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions. Let us 
consider briefly how each of these dimensions might fit in our investigation of natural 
law traditions. 
The descriptive dimension is evident in the approach of ethical naturalism. Lovin 
and Reynolds give accounts of the “wildly complex and different ways” religious 
practitioners construe the moral life within a single religious tradition like Buddhism, for 
example.44 Pointing to this diversity within traditions is the greatest strength of their 
approach. Within Buddhism, Thai Theravāda Buddhists, Tibetan Vajrayana Buddhists, 
Vietnamese Mahayana Buddhists, and Japanese Zen Buddhists, are all traditions 
expressing the variety of Buddhist practice. Moreover, within any one of these traditions, 
greater specificity exists, as Frank Reynolds’ work on Theravāda Buddhism has shown. 
Reynolds recognizes that there are two interdependent but distinct modes of ethical life 
shaped by overlapping cosmologies: samsaric and Buddhic.45 Other scholars have also 
referred to this distinction as the karmic and nirvanic paths that are sometimes used to 
distinguish the monastic and lay lifestyles.46 Another aspect of the descriptive dimension 
in religious ethics is that it “is linked to other interpretive disciplines.”47 My investigation 
will utilize the interpretive resources of moral philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre 
and Charles Taylor and the Jewish political theology of David Novak. 
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The normative dimension is emphasized the most in this thesis. The rationale for 
this has to do with my decision, alongside Fasching and Schweiker, to frame comparative 
religious ethics within the context of moral diversity and a pluralistic society. With the 
ensuing risk of normlessness inaugurated by ethical relativism, the normative dimension 
in comparative ethics is especially important. This dimension highlights the norms and 
values that ought to guide human life according to the traditions in question. But there is 
also sensitivity to the “distinct and sometimes conflicting sources” of those norms and 
values within a single tradition.48 Two common sources often articulated by religious 
traditions include reason, the native intelligence of human beings, and revelation, or the 
ultimate truth claims preserved by the historical community. In our inquiry into natural 
law ethics, we will see that reason and revelation are two sources that are inextricably 
bound, with the special revelation or insight as that which illuminates natural or mundane 
reason. I will also be using the term normative in reference to discourse. By using natural 
law as a mode of normative discourse the traditions in question distinguish between two 
levels of discourse: those within the tradition and those outside the tradition. These two 
levels translate into the general and special categories of discourse. Formulating the 
modes of natural law discourse will support my thesis that natural law traditions contain 
the conceptual resources for transcending traditions to find commonality and differences 
with others in an effort to pursue the ultimate truth. 
The practical dimension discloses the point that all moral thinking and judgments 
are situated in practices. That is because, “Traditions develop complex and subtle patterns 
 
48 Ibid. 
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of moral reasoning in order to answer the practical questions of life.”49 Aristotle was 
among the first great philosophers to show that theoretical knowledge can only be 
achieved through praxis. This emphasis on practice opens us to the important ethical 
concept known as virtue. For Aristotle, the virtues are acquired “by first having actually 
practiced them” (NE 1103a32). In other words, habit (ethos) produces moral (ethike) 
virtue (NE 1103a18). This view assures that ethics is always concrete and lived and never 
too abstract and theoretical. In our investigation, virtues such as prudence, justice, 
compassion, and charity are crucial to understanding the Theravāda and Thomistic 
natural law traditions. When considering natural law ethics within religious traditions we 
must keep this practical dimension at the front of our inquiry, especially since natural 
law is often misrepresented as an abstract moral theory about a neutral law stemming 
from a transcendent lawgiver that has ultimately no effect on actual life and public 
discourse.50 
Since religions present “fantastically complex accounts of agency,” a fundamental 
dimension in ethical inquiry is needed.51 As an example, within a Christian framework, 
moral agency might integrate the complex relations between sin, the will, conscience, and 
God’s grace. These elements are all fundamental to moral agency and reveal how 
religions offer a rich language for understanding moral sources. For both of the natural 
law traditions, the concept of “nature” is fundamental for understanding how moral 
sources operate. Therefore, an ontological account is necessary for natural law ethics.  
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Moral philosopher Charles Taylor has noted that “our sense of admiration and 
awe” for certain capacities that we believe to be in God, the Buddha, or Muhammad “is 
what empowers us to live up to them.”52 The concept of the good that is related to the 
question, “What is the good life?” focuses the concern on moral sources. The norms, 
values, and virtues that define the religious ethics of a tradition are constituted by moral 
sources. Applying this fundamental dimension to our inquiry will bring out the various 
goods that natural law accounts identify as essential to moral agency and offer proper 
orientation for human “nature.” I use Charles Taylor’s categories for distinguishing these 
goods as life goods (or virtues), hypergoods (the aim of moral agency) and constitutive 
goods (that which empowers the moral agent) that have a fundamental teleological 
orientation.53
The metaethical dimension is the last of Schweiker’s multidimensional model and 
it is often the most overlooked or neglected. He notes that, “Every religion, despite what 
modern critics hold, purports to be truth seeking.”54 In the case of Green’s deep structure 
approach, the metaethical dimension has superiority over all other dimensions. I am 
careful not to repeat this methodological limitation of assigning a single structure of 
reason to all traditions. Instead, we will adopt Alasdair MacIntyre’s view of rationality as 
tradition-constituted as our metaethical language. Each natural law tradition’s standard of 
rationality is defined or constituted by a unique conception of ultimate truth that orders 
all particular truths.  
 
52 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1989), 94. 
53 Charles Taylor, “Leading a Life,” in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, ed. 
Ruth Chang (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 170-183. 
54 Schweiker (2005), 9. 
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As a note, our analysis of these traditions cannot strip them of their respective 
metaphysical and cosmological worldviews. Just as Lovin and Reynolds have argued, 
“worldview and norms,” or cosmology and ethics, are inseparable. Therefore, our 
analysis of natural law traditions cannot ignore metaphysics and cosmology because 
these living traditions are truth seeking and “nature” or ontology is always situated within 
this context. But metaphysics and cosmology are not the fundamental dimensions 
because ethics and ontology reserve that position. Instead, they are at best secondary, 
serving as the “integral heuristic structure” for understanding moral agency and the 
pursuit of truth through questioning.55  
Religions often posit a constitutive good that is the originating source of the moral 
life but also identify this as the constitutive truth as well. Natural law is a metaethical 
category since it suggests that all human beings have access to the moral structure that is 
embedded in a metaphysical or cosmological worldview. But these accounts part from 
Green in the sense that natural law is understood as originating from a metaphysical or 
cosmological context that is situated within a tradition grounded in special revelation or 
special insight. In other words, the natural law that can be known by moral agents is 
revealed by the constitutive truth, be it the Dhamma or God. Natural law is nothing like 
the deep structure which offers an ahistorical account of religious reason. In the next 
chapter, I consider a tradition-constituted model of rationality and a notion of revelation 
as a historical phenomenon that argues for the explanatory power of historical 
contingency. Both of these views will be compatible with our concept of a natural law 
tradition from our hermeneutical standpoint. 
 
55 See Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (Great Britain: Herder and Herder, 1972), 343 and 
“Philosophy and the Religious Phenomenon,” METHOD: Journal of Lonergan Studies, 12 (1994), 136. 
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Hermeneutical Standpoint 
Our investigation began by situating the field of comparative religious ethics 
within the global context of pluralism and moral diversity. This is characteristic of the 
“hermeneutical-dialogical paradigm” that we are aiming to achieve alongside Fasching, 
deChant, and Schweiker. Fasching and deChant, I noted, claimed that comparative 
religious ethics must face the challenge of ethical relativism. The way out of this 
problem, according to them, is to engage in dialogue regarding global ethical issues with 
those of other religious and moral traditions. Some of the major global issues that are 
addressed by Fasching and deChant include ethnocentrism, genocide, war, racism, and 
sexism.  
In my conclusion, I will turn to the question of human dignity within a secular 
democratic context to see how the natural law traditions in question respond to this issue. 
It is only from this kind of a hermeneutical and dialogical standpoint that comparative 
religious ethics can promote “religious humanism” or “the way of all the earth.” 
Twentieth century saints like Mohandas K. Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. realized 
this paradigm not only in their comparative studies of each other’s traditions, but also in 
their socio-political pursuit of justice. Neither one strayed from keeping religious ethics 
both “religious and ethical.”56
The term “global reflexivity” used by Schweiker refers to “the ways in which 
communities appear in ‘the gaze of the other’.”57 It echoes what Fasching and deChant 
refer to as the sympathetic process of “passing over” into another tradition to see the 
 
56 William Schweiker, “On the Future of Religious Ethics: Keeping Religious Ethics, Religious and 
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world from their eyes and “coming back” to one’s own tradition enriched.58 The religious 
ethicist in this model “does not simply exist within or outside actual traditions. She or he 
is always thinking at the lateral connections among communities, traditions, and 
intellectual practices.”59  
This concern for lateral connections is the aim of normative discourse. Natural 
law traditions contain a bicameral view of normative discourse in which they can think 
and communicate with those in their tradition and with those in other traditions. The 
important point is that the dialogue partners adjust themselves accordingly and revise 
their interpretations readily in light of new insights from the other. It makes these 
traditions quite compatible, in theory at least, for working through global reflexivity 
alongside others in economic, legal, political, ethical, and cultural matters.60  
 
Tasks of Comparative Methodology 
 There are two tasks to our multidimensional hermeneutical approach to 
comparative religious ethics: the comparative task and the constructive task. The 
normative dimension, I pointed out, is the most important among the other dimensions in 
this thesis because it responds directly to the problem of moral diversity. But this 
dimension could decrease in importance depending on one’s hermeneutical standpoint. 
As scholars within a secular and pluralistic society inheriting the disenchanted worldview 
of technological modernity, our concern is with the preservation and articulation of 
worthwhile norms and values. If not, our culture might fully succumb to the forces of 
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radical individualism, instrumental reason, atomism, and meaninglessness.61 Therefore, 
the dimensions of inquiry are relative to the hermeneutical standpoint of the scholar. 
Meanwhile, the tasks of our methodology are not as flexible because they define the 
process and aim of our investigation. 
It may seem redundant to declare our task as comparative in the method of 
comparative religious ethics. This point cannot be overstated because the reality is that 
many approaches claim to do comparative religious ethics but very few actually succeed. 
The empirical approach has done comparison the least across traditions. Lovin and 
Reynolds and their followers succeed in doing comparison within a single tradition but 
seem to have no concern comparing other traditions side by side. Green’s formalist 
approach, on the surface, may look like he is doing comparison on a grand systematic 
level. But I noted the limitations of this approach for reasons that include its apparent 
lack of appreciation for moral diversity and autonomy. 
I count the work of Fasching and deChant and the recent project of Aaron 
Stalnaker among those who have done this successfully. The comparative task for them 
has the purpose of achieving insight. Gandhi and King lived this comparative task in their 
path toward nonviolence, of which Fasching and deChant refer to as the greatest ethical 
response to injustice. It was attained through a “meeting and sharing of religious and 
cultural insight.”62 Gandhi read and meditated on Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount and then 
reinterpreted the Bhagavad-Gītā through the Gospel ethic of nonviolence. King, on the 
other hand, reinterpreted his Christian social ethic in light of Gandhi’s operational 
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technique of nonviolence. In scholarly academic terms, what these saintly lives translate 
into and demonstrate is that the process of comparative research is one of moving back 
and forth between religious worlds refining both the categories of analysis and one’s 
initial hunches.63  
This is the task set before us in our investigation of natural law ethics in the 
Theravāda and Thomistic traditions. The comparative task encourages us to place the 
natural law traditions side by side in an effort to demonstrate how they are functionally 
similar for establishing a complex account of moral agency within a specific moral 
universe. Thus our scope in some way is narrowed to these natural law traditions. But 
that is because I am not making a universalistic claim like Green that all religious 
traditions demonstrate a natural law ethic that is a deep structure. Natural law thinking 
may belong to various religious traditions, but it is only one more way of construing the 
moral life among others. I claim that natural law traditions function by using similar 
categories for discourse or dialogue that distinguishes general knowledge and special 
knowledge. These parameters of discourse can serve as both a bridge and unity between 
traditions to promote the common good and a way of designating moral differences. 
 The constructive task, or what Stalnaker refers to as the normative task, assists 
ethical reflection amidst “our own pluralistic, conflicted, and possibility-strewn 
contemporary context.”64 In other words, it reflects our hermeneutical standpoint and is 
concerned with the “use of religious sources in meeting current problems.”65 But this is 
not merely enough. With the comparative task in mind, scholars aid in the reconstruction 
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of the religious traditions themselves amidst global reflexivity. This is why Schweiker 
refers to the scholar’s involvement as both religious and ethical. She or he may have to 
“extend religious enactments of the moral space of life,”66 especially if the religious 
tradition is in some way betraying human dignity. There is no need to wear two hats in 
this model of scholarly inquiry.  
Situating natural law traditions within a hermeneutical context, most especially 
moral diversity and democratic pluralism, will be our main attempt to pursue this 
constructive task. The endpoint of this inquiry is to formulate a language of normative 
discourse derived from the similar conceptual apparatus of these natural law traditions 
that could be used to address global ethical issues such as human dignity and human 
rights, interreligious dialogue, and secularity. Our purpose for using the method of 
comparative religious ethics through a multidimensional hermeneutical approach is to 
recover these natural law traditions in a way that maintains a level of religious integrity 
that is amendable to our contemporary context and also suggest what these traditions can 
constructively offer to moral debates in our global society. 
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Chapter Two: The Concept of a Natural Law Tradition 
 
 
 Since the hermeneutical standpoint of this thesis is framed within a global context 
of pluralism and moral diversity, the normative dimension is of great moral import to our 
inquiry. In this chapter, we shall consider a few of the primary normative areas in the 
natural law accounts of the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions. Our purpose for doing 
this is to formulate a mode of normative discourse that is authentic to these natural law 
traditions but is in line with our multidimensional hermeneutical inquiry. The areas of 
normativity for natural law of interest to us include the concept of a natural law tradition, 
its basis of authority and narrative context, and its mode of discourse. These normative 
areas should provide the framework for understanding how these natural law traditions 
avoid the pitfalls of authoritarianism and ethical relativism.  
To achieve this from a hermeneutical standpoint, we must address the challenge 
of a modern secular worldview such as our own. That means the natural law ethics of the 
Theravāda and Thomistic traditions need to be sensitive to the historical turn of modern 
and postmodern thinking that has demythologized what Bernard Lonergan refers to as the 
‘classisict’ worldview: “classicism is no more than the mistaken view of conceiving 
culture normatively and of concluding that there is just one human culture.”1 As a result, 
there must be a degree of historicizing these natural law accounts. This does not require a 
radical reinterpretation of the natural law traditions in question because as we shall see, 
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their accounts of natural law are quite amendable to the contemporary worldview and 
even have something to offer it. It will require us though to grant metaphysics and 
cosmology a secondary role with ethics and ontology our fundamental dimension. 
Metaphysics and cosmology serve as integral heuristic moral structures within which one 
pursues the question of ultimate truth.   
As part of our descriptive dimension of conversing with other disciplines, through 
the help of Alasdair MacIntyre and David Novak, I will construct a concept of a natural 
law tradition that is compatible with modern secularity and the Theravāda and Thomistic 
traditions. This is not coincidental. In fact, MacIntyre’s concept of tradition is derived 
specifically from his thoughtful analysis of the thought of Thomas Aquinas and the 
emergence of the Thomistic tradition.2 Similar to this account of tradition, but from a 
theological perspective, is Novak’s notion of “historical communities,” which he 
constructs from the natural law tradition of Judaism.3 A synthesis of their views affords 
us a concept of natural law tradition that is compatible with the historical turn of modern 
thinking without denying the tradition’s claims to truth. There will be three essential 
features to this concept of a natural law tradition: a tradition-constituted model of 
rationality, revelation as historical phenomenon, and natural law as a cultural construct 
that is both comparative and ontological. 
 
Rationality, Revelation, and Natural Law 
Our starting point of formulating a concept of a natural law tradition compatible 
with our hermeneutical standpoint is Alasdair MacIntyre’s view of rationality and 
                                                 
2 See Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1990), Chapters 5 and 6. 
3 See David Novak, Natural Law in Judaism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Chapter 1. 
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tradition. MacIntyre historicizes rationality in the following way: “rationality itself… is a 
concept with a history.”4 As many as there are traditions embodying their own histories, 
so too are there “rationalities,” each providing its own standards of rational justification. 
This account is similar to Lovin and Reynolds, except that as a moral philosopher 
MacIntyre is willing to say a lot more about the issue of relativism.  
In MacIntyre’s account, there is the possibility of a tradition being superior to 
rival traditions.5 This happens when an alien tradition offers “a cogent and illuminating 
explanation” to a tradition in epistemological crisis. This tradition in crisis adopts this 
explanation for itself to establish internal coherence.6 Although the tradition in crisis is 
still using its own standards of rational justification to measure the coherence and 
cogency of the alien tradition’s explanation, it must acknowledge one fact: “the new 
explanation does not stand in any substantive unity with the preceding history of the 
tradition in crisis.”7  
When considering religious traditions, I find MacIntyre’s language of “rival” and 
“superior” traditions too antagonistic for our model. There has been enough sectarian 
religious violence over the course of history and even today to necessitate an alternative 
kind of discourse. Furthermore, recognizing the superiority of another philosophical or 
political tradition is not nearly as difficult as claiming the superiority of another religious 
tradition.8 But this does not take away from MacIntyre’s underlying point of value: 
commensurability and translatability is possible in a rational way across traditions. What 
 
4 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1988), 9. 
5 I should point out the obvious fact that his notion of superiority is made solely on intellectual grounds. 
6 Ibid., 364-5. 
7 Ibid., 365. 
8 I am not against the possibility of someone acknowledging a privileged access to truth by virtue of their 
religious tradition. But certainly, self-superiority should not be a feature of interreligious dialogue. 
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we are interested then is the possibility of other traditions illuminating one’s own 
tradition. A person in one religious tradition might receive illumination from another 
religious tradition but this need not conclude that the home tradition is inferior. If this 
were the case, then MacIntyre’s account seems to imply the possibility of everyone 
moving toward a single tradition based on the logical outcome and awareness of that 
tradition’s rational superiority. This would only revert to a universalization or 
homogenization of discourse, which we trying to avoid in our model. Instead, it makes 
more sense for religious traditions to consider the possibility that another tradition, 
religious or not, might illuminate their own understanding of truth. This grants thereby a 
level of autonomy to the other tradition. In this way, two traditions can have shared 
insight. It is especially evident in the life of Gandhi when he claimed that the Sermon on 
the Mount was the interpretive key for understanding the Gītā message of nonviolence.9 
Let us now consider MacIntyre’s view of rationality and what he means by 
standards. Rationality, which is purely contingent upon history, is a tradition-constituted 
enterprise.10 But if traditions provide the content for rational justification, what then is the 
content of traditions? According to MacIntyre, a tradition “is an historically extended, 
socially embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which 
constitute that tradition.”11 Those goods might refer to certain virtues like justice and 
integrity, what MacIntyre refers to as particular or limited goods.12 The exercise of 
virtues, in part, determines the health of a tradition. But, more importantly, these goods 
are shaped by an overriding good or telos that constitutes the tradition. The overriding 
                                                 
9 Fasching and deChant, 126. 
10 MacIntyre (1988), 354. 
11 Ibid. (1984), 222. 
12 Ibid., 203 
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good “warrants putting other goods in a subordinate place.”13 I shall have more to say 
about this later because our natural law accounts require conceptions of the good that are 
set within a teleological framework. Achieving this good is determined by whether or not 
one is in harmony with the directedness of the higher law. 
A telos or overriding good for a tradition is a primary constituent in shaping the 
rationality of that tradition. That is because the pursuit of an overriding good that orders 
the limited goods “gives a tradition its particular point and purpose.”14 Since traditions 
are ‘socially embodied arguments’ that extend through many generations, the pursuit of 
goods is not without debate and discourse. Every tradition is made up of a community, 
institutional forms, and practices. The function of these social expressions is to preserve 
and pass along the goods of a tradition to an individual. Along with the overriding good, 
a tradition also delivers “a conception of a truth beyond and ordering all particular 
truths.”15 This observation is essential to our conception of a natural law tradition. 
MacIntyre’s conception of a higher truth or constitutive truth ‘ordering all particular 
truths’ and an overriding good is the framework for understanding the rationality of a 
natural law tradition.  
In this model, an overriding good may be equivalent with the constitutive truth of 
a tradition. That is the case with the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions, where the 
overriding good that is also the constitutive truth, is designated as Dhamma and God. The 
Dhammapada (Path of Truth), for example, describes the Buddha’s true Teaching 
(Dhamma) as a flavor that “excels all other flavors” and a delight that “surpasses all 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 222. 
15 Ibid. (1990), 200.  
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delights” (Dh v. 354). This metaphorical language here equates the truth with a supreme 
good beyond the qualities of taste and pleasure. Similarly, St. Thomas’s Christian 
metaphysics claims that the “true and good are appropriated to God” (DQTruth 1).   
Truth, according to MacIntyre’s concept of tradition, is the measure of our warrants—the 
reasonable grounds for some act.16 In our traditions in question, Dhamma and God, as 
both the constitutive truth and the overriding good, establish the standards of rationality. 
When it comes to a single human agent, each tradition also identifies a hypergood as the 
aim of religious practice.17 Perfect happiness (beatitudo perfecta) attained in heaven for 
Aquinas and the “blowing out” (nibbāna) of desire that is enlightenment for the Buddha 
both qualify as hypergoods. This theme will receive further exploration in chapter 4. 
Natural law thinking and reasoning in the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions is 
thereby constituted by a higher truth that is also construed as a higher law ordering all 
particular moral judgments of the human agent. The truth providing the standard is 
synonymous with the law providing the measure for all human acts. Our work in the next 
section should demonstrate this congruence between the constitutive truth and the higher 
law in the natural law traditions. Let us now consider the work of David Novak who uses 
a similar notion of tradition known as historical community that attempts to preserve the 
value of religious truths and revelations within a democratic political context. It should 
assist us in refining our concept of a natural law tradition that is sensitive to the modern 
secular outlook. 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 202. 
17 I am using an ethical concept described by Charles Taylor that specifically pertains to what is good for 
the moral agent thereby distinguishing it from a good that constitutes this. In other words, it is in light of 
the constitutive good that one achieves the hypergood. In Theravāda Buddhism, for example, it is only by 
seeing the world through the Dhamma (constitutive good) that one can achieve the hypergood of 
enlightenment.  
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The hermeneutical standpoint of David Novak’s thinking is secular democratic 
societies. His argument is that these modern societies should be viewed by citizens as 
secondary to historical communities, which should be primary. A historical community is 
a singular and traditional community that precedes the existing temporal order and is 
rooted in revelation or religiously constituted. He observes, “I know of no historically 
transmitted culture that when probed deeply enough does not invoke some transcendent 
reality as its source.”18 Therefore, he interprets a religious concept such as revelation as a 
“historical phenomenon.”19  
Novak’s concern is that without a concept of historical communities to ground 
secular democratic society, the ideas of social contracts and human rights are artificial 
and without substance. That is because these ideas were founded on a fictional view of 
society as an agreement made up by self-constituted individuals coming together from a 
“state of nature.”20 The social contract “presupposes that its parties come to it with rights 
that are their already,” with those prior rights originating in historical communities.21 In 
the Jewish tradition, the idea of covenant precedes and grounds all other social, legal, and 
political contracts. Covenants thus serve as the foundation for contracts from a Jewish 
perspective.22  
Historical communities, in his view, are seen as external authorities because they 
not only historically precede the current order but also because they derive their authority 
from a transcendent source. Although I have some reservation about what kinds of 
 
18 Novak (1998), 22. 
19 Ibid., 12. 
20 Ibid., 22. 
21 David Novak, The Jewish Social Contract (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 2. 
22 Ibid., 63. 
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traditions might actually be considered historical communities according to Novak,23 his 
reflection can nonetheless guide us in formulating a concept of a natural law tradition.  
 We can see a similarity between what I am calling higher law and a constitutive 
truth in MacIntyre’s concept of tradition and Novak’s idea of covenant as a religious 
foundation rooted in a transcendent source that orders all particular or temporal contracts. 
The common theme in their accounts is that tradition and historical communities are 
constituted by an order and truth that is higher than this particular existence. Whereas 
MacIntyre stops short as a social and moral philosopher in discussing what the higher 
truth might be, Novak as a theologian identifies it as God’s Law.  
Indebted to the Hebrew Scriptures, rabbinic theology, and Jewish legal tradition, 
Novak develops an account of natural law with public relevance. He defines natural law 
in Judaism as a “border concept” between theology and philosophy and between other 
traditions in the following way: 
On the surface, it functions like the idea of natural rights, that is, it proposes rules, 
procedures, and even principles for the governance of civil society. But unlike the 
idea of human rights it does not claim to be self-constituting. By its real assertion 
of nature, it indicates that it is rooted in an order that transcends any imminent 
society.24
 
In the preceding passage, we can isolate the two dimensions required for a natural 
law theory according to Novak: the comparative and the ontological.25 The former 
dimension illustrates that an account of natural law must seek commonalities across 
traditions, hence engaging in the comparative task. This is why Novak says, “natural law 
functions as a bridge between cultures, preventing any of them from cornering the market 
 
23 For example, would a new religious movement such as Mormonism rooted in revelation be considered a 
“historical community”? 
24 Novak (1998), 25. 
25 Ibid., 156. 
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on humankind and humanity.”26 For Judaism, Novak argues that the Noahide law given 
as a universal law for mankind represents a Scriptural account of the natural law. 
Therefore, Scripture serves as the foundation for natural law thinking. This interpretation 
overcomes the possibility of Enlightenment universalism or totalism that attempts to 
explain the morality of all diverse cultures in terms of a transcendental viewpoint that has 
been achieved by a single ethical theory.27 A natural law tradition does not claim to offer 
a detailed explanation of other moralities. Instead, it offers a “universal horizon” from 
which it includes other moral traditions and claims at least to have a minimum in 
common with other traditions.28 Natural law thinking doesn’t attempt to establish a 
universal morality but instead recognizes the dignity of difference as a precondition for 
the gift of revelation or insight. Its purpose, in our investigation, is to open up a mode of 
discourse with other traditions to illuminate overlapping moralities and identify moral 
divergences. Thus the comparative dimension of natural law thinking transcends cultures 
by locating both its similarities and differences with other traditions. 
The ontological dimension demonstrates that natural law accounts must be 
conversant with both theology and philosophy, in order to formulate a cogent account of 
human nature. Philosophical thinking moves from ethics up to ontology, whereas 
theology is the reverse from ontology up to ethics.29 Regardless, the two shall meet 
somewhere thereby making the reflection on “nature” a normative endeavor necessary for 
natural law. Thinking about law without nature would amount to “law without discernible 
 
26 Ibid.,178 
27 Ibid., 191. 
28 Ibid., 189 
29 Ibid. 
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reason,”30 perhaps conjuring up an image of an irrational God or a totalitarian state that 
deprives basic dignity to others. These ontological and comparative dimensions of 
Novak’s natural law account shall guide our investigation of the Theravāda and 
Thomistic traditions. They coincide with the metaethical and fundamental dimensions, 
and the overall comparative task of our multidimensional approach. 
If revelation is a ‘historical phenomenon’ for Novak, then it should be no surprise 
that he interprets natural law as a “cultural construct.” We have already seen how his 
conception of historical communities allows for a cultural construct like natural law to 
still carry weight in public discourse. A cultural construct, in his view, does not have the 
same meaning as ‘human constructs’ such as human rights or the social contract. 
Interpreting natural law as a cultural construct is consistent with our attempt to formulate 
a concept of a natural law tradition that can designate its importance in public discourse 
and limits as well. He notes that, “the greatest vulnerability to natural law theory… is its 
seeming oblivion to and disrespect of cultural diversity, especially in normative 
matters.”31 Aristotle and Plato, for example, were guilty of the classicist worldview we 
noted earlier in their presupposition that Greek thought and culture spoke for humanity as 
a whole. The Hellenistic military campaigns of Alexander the Great, a student of 
Aristotle, attest to this.  
Novak’s response to this vulnerability is to historicize natural law by identifying 
the revelation upon which it is legitimated (i.e., the Torah) as a historical phenomenon. In 
this way, he overcomes the vulnerability of a classicist worldview that premoderns and 
moderns alike have been prey. A historical community with a natural law vocabulary is 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 122 
31 Ibid., 188. 
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but one community among a plurality of others participating in a democratic ethos. With 
this vulnerability in mind, we can agree with Novak to an extent that “metaphysics is not 
the way to constitute natural law.”32  
What Novak wants to avoid, and rightfully so, is an account of natural theology or 
metaphysical biology that designates a specific community’s revelation or philosophical 
anthropology as a self-evident truth binding on everyone. Novak claims that his 
ontological account of human beings is derived not from metaphysics, but from the 
doctrine of creation. Since creation of the world precedes the historical revelation to the 
Jewish community at Sinai, it “does not allow any member of the covenanted community 
to ignore the world beyond the community facing her.”33 This might be a faithful move in 
Judaism but not for the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions. To wholly ignore the 
metaphysical and cosmological underpinnings of the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions 
or simply dismiss it as premodern would not be keeping to our ethical and religious aim.  
The accounts of natural law in these traditions cannot be detached from 
metaphysics and cosmology because it is central to the metaethical theories of these 
traditions. Therefore, as we noted, metaphysics and cosmology better serve us as 
heuristic devices secondary to the fundamental dimension of ethics and ontology. As 
heuristic devices they are quite helpful in locating the place and significance of people 
outside the tradition. In other words, considering the natural law from within the 
cosmological and metaphysical worldviews of these traditions will assist us in analyzing 
the comparative and ontological dimensions of the natural law. It will also illustrate how 
these traditions pursue ultimate truth. 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 26. 
33 Ibid, 190. 
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Like Rabbinic Judaism, the Thomistic metaphysics of participation also rests 
upon the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, while the Theravādin cosmology of 
interdependence is understood in terms of the doctrine of dependent origination (pattica-
samuppāda). It is from these cosmological and metaphysical worldviews that these 
natural law traditions pursue the question of constitutive truth. The standards of 
rationality are determined by the truth that structures the metaphysical or cosmological 
order in the natural law tradition. To heed Novak’s warning of metaphysics and natural 
theology, these doctrines or truths should be viewed as a special revelation or special 
insight and interpreted as historical phenomena. Therefore, in the traditions in question, 
the special revelation of God achieving normative expression in Scripture and the special 
insight of the Buddha having normative expression in the Pāli Canon, are the ways of 
constituting natural law. But, of equal importance, is the comparative dimension of 
illuminating natural law by seeking commonalities with other traditions. 
 
Natural Law Traditions  
The concept of a natural law tradition we have been formulating according to the 
works of MacIntyre and Novak should now be evident. Their accounts contain three 
primary characteristics for a natural law tradition that I am conceptualizing: rationality as 
tradition-constituted; revelation as a historical phenomenon; and natural law as a cultural 
construct that is both comparative and ontological. These characteristics reflect the 
historical turn in contemporary ethical thought, but do so without abandoning the 
concepts of higher law and constitutive truth. Their notions of tradition and historical 
community offer us a working model that is amendable to the natural law traditions in 
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question and compatible to our hermeneutical standpoint. This model is conducive to our 
natural law traditions in that it allows for illumination or shared insight between 
traditions and recognizes the limits and possibilities of democratic participation for these 
natural law traditions.  
Since our hermeneutical standpoint is framed within the global context of moral 
diversity and pluralism, an account must be given of how the natural law traditions can 
respond. My claim is that these natural law traditions thrive on discourse about moral 
truths with other traditions while continuing to pursue ultimate truth claims within their 
own metaphysical or cosmological worldviews. These traditions aim to discover shared 
insights and mutual illumination with discourse partners. But they do so without positing 
moral authoritarianism. The intent is never to proselytize because natural law traditions 
recognize the autonomy of other traditions. Natural law traditions respect the brute fact of 
moral differences and begin from this premise.  
 
Dhamma in the Theravāda Tradition  
The Theravāda, or “Way of the Elders” tradition, refers to the most ancient school 
of Buddhism in existence today whose textual authority is derived from the Pāli Canon. 
This tradition is geographically situated in the Southeast Asian countries of Thailand, Sri 
Lanka, Burma, Laos and Cambodia. The origin of what we call Buddhism as a religious 
tradition is attributed to Tathāgata Buddha, born as Prince Siddhartha Gotama (563-483 
BCE). Having spent his life in the confines of a palace environment amidst worldly 
pleasures and wholly ignorant of the outside world, Gotama’s experience of the “passing 
sights” outside the palace sent him into a whirlwind of confusion and sadness. The three 
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encounters of an old man, a sick man, and a corpse exposed the prince to the existence of 
suffering (dukkha) and the impermanence (anicca) of life. But it was his encounter with 
an ascetic monk in pursuit of the truth that attracted him to an alternative lifestyle that 
hinted at a solution to the problems to aging, sickness, and death. Toward the end of his 
life, the Buddha himself recounted to a student what followed: “When I was twenty-nine, 
Subhadda, I left home to seek the greatest good. Now more than fifty years have passed, 
Subhadda, since I renounced the world.”34 
Gotama renounced his royal lifestyle leaving behind his wife and child, which 
was accepted in the context of classical Indian society. For six years, Gotama studied 
various dharma through meditative concentration (samādhi) and other spiritual practices 
with different teachers, but none of these teachings left him satisfied. He then discovered 
his own path toward an enlightened state. It occurred one day sitting under the Bodhi tree 
while he was recovering from his ascetic and emaciated condition. During this 
experience, the Buddha had direct insight into the true nature of things and achieved 
enlightenment (nibbāna). He decided to return to the world out of compassion to preach 
the Dhamma, or Teaching.35 In the first discourse of his enlightened state, the Deer Park 
Sermon, Gotama Buddha, “the Awakened One,” taught the Dhamma as the middle way 
between austerity and worldly pleasure. The solution lay in the Noble Eightfold Path that 
leads to the cessation (nirodha) of suffering.36 
                                                 
34 From Digha Nikāya, referenced by Hajime Nakamura, Gotama Buddha (Japan: Kosei, 2000), 107. 
35 I use the Pāli spelling of “Dhamma” to maintain the language of Theravāda Buddhism. It is the same 
word as the Sanskrit, “Dharma.” 
36 The Noble Eightfold Path includes Right View, Right Resolve, Right Speech, Right Action, Right 
Livelihood, Right Effort, Right Mindfulness, and Right Meditation. 
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The Dhamma preached by the Buddha has a variety of translations in the 
Theravāda tradition including “holy wisdom, salvific truth, teaching, and doctrine.”37 
According to the scholastic Abhidhamma literature that developed a couple of centuries 
after the Buddha’s final death (parinibbāna), dhammā38 or “existents,” refer to separately 
existing objects of consciousness that can be accessed or penetrated by the trained 
mind.39 In the Theravāda tradition both Dhamma/dhammā refer to a singular reality of 
interdependence that the practitioner can experience through insight.40  
To designate Theravāda Buddhism as a natural law tradition we must focus on the 
ethical, ontological, and cosmological implications of Dhamma. I am not attempting to 
articulate a new area of inquiry here but drawing upon the work of Western scholars in 
Buddhist ethics. My account of Dhamma as “natural law” is indebted primarily to the 
works of Sallie King, Damien Keown, and Joanna Macy. The obvious challenge in 
designating Theravāda Buddhism as a natural law tradition is that the term “natural law” 
already contains the Western bias of monotheistic natural law traditions such as Novak’s 
Judaism and Thomism. The proliferation of this term in other traditions that function in a 
similar yet unique way other than the monotheistic accounts belongs to my task. As a 
starting point, let us consider Keown’s definition of the term: 
Dharma may be translated as “natural law,” a term which captures both its 
important meanings, namely as the principle of order and regularity seen in the 
behavior of natural phenomena, and also the idea of a universal moral law whose 
requirements have been discovered (not invented) by enlightened beings such as 
the Buddha.41 
                                                 
37 Carl Olson, The Different Paths of Buddhism (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 35. 
38 Plural form of dhamma.” 
39 Steven Collins, Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 88. 
40 Noa Ronkin, Early Buddhist Metaphysics (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 36. 
41 Damien Keown, “Origins of Buddhist Ethics,” in The Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics, ed. 
William Schweiker (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), 288. 
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From this definition, the inextricability of natural phenomena and moral law is 
presented thus demonstrating the importance of having an account of nature available to 
address the question of Buddhist ethics. Keown also notes another significant point, that 
the Buddha “discovered” the Dhamma. Therefore, the truth of this teaching preexists the 
life and death of the “thus come, thus gone” Buddha. The Dhamma as natural law and 
truth is objective and independent of anyone’s awareness. Thus it meets our criterion of a 
constitutive truth: “Whether there is an arising of Tathāgatas or no arising of Tathāgatas, 
that element still persists [dependent origination], the stableness of Dhamma, the fixed 
course of Dhamma, specific conditionality” (SN 12:20; II 25-27).42 
Although some Western scholars of Buddhist ethics have identified Dhamma as 
natural law, two Thai Theravāda monk-scholars have used this terminology extensively 
in their teaching, Phra Prayudh Payutto and the late Bhikkhu Buddhadasa.43 Their work is 
concerned primarily with the ethical, spiritual, and social implications of Dhamma. The 
moral discipline of proper conduct (sīla), the virtue of compassion (karuna), the spiritual 
practice of meditation (samādhi), and the achievement of a just society are all the direct 
result of humans acting in accord with the laws of nature. In the model of natural law 
shared by both Payutto and Buddhadasa, the “ought” of moral behavior is derived from 
what “is” the case in nature.44 Let us consider some of the basic tenets of Buddhist ethics 
from a natural law perspective. 
                                                 
42 All translations of the Pāli Nikāyas, unless otherwise noted, are taken from In the Buddha’s Words, ed. 
Bhikkhu Bodhi (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2005). 
43 Sallie B. King, Being Benevolence: The Social Ethics of Engaged Buddhism  (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai’i Press, 2005), 43. 
44 Sallie B. King, “From Is to Ought: Natural Law in Buddhadasa Bhikkhu and Phra Prayudh Payutto,” 
Journal of Religious Ethics 30, no. 2 (2002), 281. 
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The Eightfold Path that leads to enlightenment follows a tripartite structure of 
moral discipline, meditation, and insight. Although these general divisions of the path are 
not hierarchically set, of these, sīla has been considered “the basis of all good qualities” 
(Mil II.1.9). Often cited as the fundamental teaching for moral discipline in Buddhism is 
this verse from the Dhammapada: “To avoid all evil, to cultivate good deeds, and to 
purify one’s mind—this is the teaching of the Buddhas” (Dh 183). The teaching, which 
has been called the heart of Buddhism,45 is strikingly similar to the primary precept of the 
natural law according to Aquinas.  
What is unclear from this teaching is the content of evil and good deeds. The 
Theravāda tradition contains a rich language of perspicuous contrast for evil and good 
acts with terminology like unwholesome and wholesome, unskillful and skillful. The Five 
Precepts (pañca-sila), identified as the minimum lay obligations, are unwholesome acts 
that require abstention from everyone. They include the abandonment of killing, stealing, 
sexual misconduct, false speech, and intoxication. The precepts are not commands of the 
natural light of reason that originates in a divine lawgiver which compels action as 
Aquinas will describe it. They are purely rational responses to the natural order. 
According to Payutto, they are the “first step” toward avoiding evil or unskillful actions 
that are derived solely from “reason and natural laws.”46 This would confirm the 
Buddha’s perspective that these are ancient, traditional, and unadulterated precepts that 
people of other traditions deem beneficial as well (AN 8:39; IV 245-47). Therefore, the 
precepts are reasonable in the sense that the common moral agent is capable of 
                                                 
45 Bhikkhu Buddhadasa, Me and Mine: Selected Essays of Bhikkhu Buddhadasa, ed. Donald K. Swearer 
(New York: SUNY Press, 1989), 91. 
46 Phra Prayudh Payutto, Buddhadhamma: Natural Laws and Values for Life, trans. Grant A. Olson (New 
York: SUNY Press, 1995), 245. 
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understanding its worth through a partial understanding of the natural law. These moral 
precepts are “a universal set of objective principles established in accordance with natural 
truths” that are observable to all persons.47  
With regard to sīla, observing the natural law or truth of kamma—the process 
determining the cause and effect between all relationships—is the key to moral 
development. That is because kamma determines the proper consequences, whether 
retributive or rewarding, based on the agent’s actions. The Buddha defines kamma simply 
as those actions issuing from cetanā, translated as “intention” or “volition” (AN III 415). 
Persons marked by extraordinary insight or wisdom (pañña) are capable of perceiving 
those laws of nature that are more difficult. The Theravāda tradition distinguishes 
between those who are only observing the law of kamma (kiriyavāda) and those who are 
able to penetrate the higher Dhamma that is more difficult to perceive. The Buddha 
himself used the terms worldly or mundane (lokiya) and world-transcending or 
supramundane (lokuttara) to designate this difference.48 This distinction between levels 
of awareness of the Dhamma will assist us in formulating the general and special 
categories of natural law discourse in Theravāda Buddhism. 
Having defined the law of kamma as part of the natural law, let us now consider 
the truths of existence and the law that require deeper insight. There are two dhammic 
principles that were taught by the Buddha according to Payutto. The first principle is the 
“three characteristics of existence” (tilakkhana) that include suffering, impermanence, 
and not-self (anattā). With regard to these characteristics, suffering and impermanence 
are truths able to be penetrated by worldly or mundane realization. The other principle is 
                                                 
47 Payutto, 249. 
48 Damien Keown, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 108-110. 
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dependent origination or dependent co-arising (pattica-samuppāda).49 This law, is the 
most difficult to perceive but when realized opens the door to understanding the truth of 
not-self. Even though distinctions are made between these principles, they all belong to 
the same reality. As Payutto puts it, “they are presented in different ways in order to 
reveal the same truth.”50  
The natural law in Theravāda Buddhism is therefore observable to everyone 
according to his or her moral and spiritual attunement with nature that is perfected 
through the Eightfold Path. From this starting point, we have a working model for a 
Theravāda natural law tradition with Dhamma as the constitutive truth. Let us now turn to 
the concept of natural law in the Thomistic tradition which is understood in a theistic 
framework instead of a naturalistic one. 
 
Natural Law in the Thomistic Tradition  
Friar Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274 CE) of the Order of Preachers lived during a 
vibrant era of western Christian Europe. The son of a count, Thomas was sent off to a 
monastery at Monte Cassino to receive higher learning from clergy to meet the demands 
of the boy’s exceptional aptitude. Thomas then went to study in the liberal setting at the 
University of Naples, reading works from Oxford thinkers, Arab Muslims, and that 
dangerous pagan philosopher, Aristotle.51 At the disapproval of his parents who had great 
political and ecclesiastical aspirations for their son, Thomas grew deeply fond of the 
simple mendicant lifestyle of the Dominicans and decided to embark for Paris to join the 
order. Hearing word of this and angered by their son’s decision to live this way, 
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50 Ibid. 
51 Richard E. Rubenstein, Aristotle’s Children (Orlando, FL: Harcourt, 2003), 195. 
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Thomas’s own family kidnapped him and held him captive at a castle estate. The only 
company he had was a couple of works by Aristotle and the Bible. Although a strange 
pair of reading materials in Aquinas’s medieval Christendom, the confluence of both in 
his thinking would transform his theological reflection into the writings of an “Angelic 
Doctor.” After two years, he was finally able to leave the fortress whereupon he joined 
the academic community at the University of Paris and studied under the tutelage of 
Albertus Magnus. Paris was precisely the kind of environment Thomas could engage in 
public debates with theological masters like St. Bonaventure. In these discourses, Thomas 
argued from a more liberal-minded Aristotelian viewpoint while the conservative 
Franciscan Bonaventure attempted to guard the traditional faith from unwelcome pagan 
philosophy.  
In mapping the emergence of the Thomistic tradition, MacIntyre convincingly 
shows what Aquinas reckoned with in his theological reflection: “two rival, incompatible 
and apparently incommensurable traditions.”52 These were of course the Aristotelian and 
the Augustinian traditions. But Thomas succeeded in synthesizing these two seemingly 
incompatible traditions. In simple terms, the unified system of thought between Aristotle 
and Augustine is captured in Aquinas’s famous dictum, “grace does not abolish nature, 
but completes it” (ST 1a 1.8).53 Here lies the formula for understanding the role that grace 
has for nature, theology for philosophy, faith for reason, and divine law for natural law.  
Aquinas claimed that Aristotle provided a philosophy proper to man’s natural 
capacities but he believed that humans have a supernatural vocation that only theology 
can disclose. “God is the ultimate end of man” and it is only in the attainment of this 
 
52 MacIntyre, (1990), 116. 
53 Cited in Rubenstein, 198. 
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ultimate end that perfect happiness (beatitudo perfecta) consists (ST 1a2ae 1.6). But 
“perfect happiness cannot be had by man in the present state of life,” therefore, it must 
consist in the afterlife because that is the promise of sacred Scripture (ST 1a2ae 3.2). 
Unlike Aristotle, who said that true happiness (eudaimonia) consisted in the intellectual 
activity of contemplation (theoria) afforded by natural reason, Aquinas believed that 
happiness “especially lies… in contemplation of the divine,” afforded by the infused 
grace of the supernatural virtues of faith and charity (ST 1a2ae 3.5). Again, returning to 
the Thomistic formula of grace perfecting nature, so too does faith perfect reason, and 
theology perfect philosophy. The same goes for his model of divine law perfecting 
natural law. In his own words, “just as grace presupposes nature, so it is right that the 
divine law should presuppose the natural law” (ST 1a2ae 99.2). He uses the term 
“superaddens” here to illustrate the notion of grace building on nature and the divine law 
building on the natural law.  
According to Thomistic anthropology, humans are made imago dei, bearing the 
analogous imprints of God’s intellect and reason (ST 1a2ae, prologue).54 Because these 
natural capacities have been created by a supernatural agent, namely God, humans are 
endowed with the “light of natural reason.” Aquinas defines this natural capacity in the 
following way: “the light of natural reason (lumen rationis naturalis), by which we 
discern what is good and what is evil—which pertains to the natural law—is nothing 
other than an impression in us of the divine light” (ST 1a2ae 91.2). 
Reason (ratio), therefore, impressed by the divine light, is that which contains the 
capacity to discern what is good and what is evil. This is, in the simplest manner, 
 
54 I would like to point out that Thomas also identifies intellect, free will, and power of self-direction, as 
imago Dei characteristics. See ST 1a2ae, prologue. 
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Aquinas’s definition of the natural law (lex naturalis). The fundamental habit that 
“secures us accessibility to notions of good and evil” is synderesis.55 This natural habit of 
synderesis, according to Aquinas, “is said to be the law of our intellect” because it 
“contains the precepts of the natural law which are the first principles (prima principia) 
of human acts” (ST 1a2ae 94.1 ad3). The primary precept that is grasped by synderesis 
from which reasoning proceeds is this: “That good should be done and pursued and evil 
avoided (bonum est faciendum et prosquendum, et malum vitandum) (ST 1a2ae 94.2). 
The first principles of rational human agency include generally known principles such as 
‘do no harm’ and ‘give every man his due.’ 
Aquinas understands humans to have a natural desire (inclinatione) toward the 
good. Practical reason, which also naturally apprehends the good, works in tandem with 
desire toward certain ends that define the common good (bonum commune): preservation 
of life, sexual intercourse and education, religious truth and social living (Ibid.). The 
primary precept or principium and the first principles that provide the reasonable starting 
points for pursuing the common good listed above are universally known or understood 
as self-evident truths (per se nota). As Aquinas puts it, “these belong to the law of nature 
absolutely” (ST 1a2ae 100, my emphasis). Knowing the wrongness of these acts can 
never be abolished from the human heart since it has been written in the human heart 
independent of special revelation (ST 1a2ae 94.6 r3).  
There are secondary precepts as well, which “are like detailed conclusions drawn 
from first principles” (ST 1a2ae 94.5 r3). These precepts illustrate the movement from the 
general knowable principles that guide practical reasoning to the particular conclusions. 
 
55 Pamela M. Hall, Narrative and the Natural Law: An Interpretation of Thomistic Ethics (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 30. 
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The secondary precepts allow for the contingency of communities, experience, and 
human weakness to shape them. This is where the activity of virtues like prudence 
(prudentia) is essential. Synderesis may secure “the starting point,” but the virtue of 
prudence aims at “the particular conclusions that can guide action.”56 In Aquinas’s 
account, practical reason is a “rule and measure” containing the law of the intellect (ST 
1a2ae 90.1).  
The moral precepts are considered external principles of human action.57 They 
originate in God’s act of creation, unlike the Five Precepts of Theravāda Buddhism that 
are natural responses derived purely from a cosmological account of nature independent 
of a deity. On the other hand, the virtues, as internal dispositions toward action, complete 
practical reason and “enable it to make correct judgments about the human good in 
particular contexts” (DQVirtGen a6). The role of virtues, therefore, in any natural law 
account is essential. The possibility of embodying certain virtues is contingent upon what 
law the moral agent is able to understand and follow. 
The divine law refers to God’s twofold (duplicem) revelation in the Old Law and 
the New Law (ST 1a2ae 91.5 r3). The Old Law refers to the revelation of God given to 
the Jews in the Old Testament to instruct them about the natural law. The New Law is the 
Gospel of Christ that fulfills the Old Law through the work of charity and grace. In the 
Thomistic account, the natural law and its precepts “provide the necessary anchor for 
practical reasoning” that “must rest on ends”58 the content of which only the divine law 
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can truly reveal. Synderesis grasps the first principles of rational moral agency, but it 
“does not provide content for our moral deliberations.”59 We noted that because humans 
have a supernatural vocation, they need the gift of faith to understand their true end of 
eternal happiness, attained in God. The natural law alone “does not suffice to order us to 
God.”60 Therefore, the revelation of divine law is “necessary for the direction of human 
life” because only God can satisfy human longing (ST 1a2ae 91.4). Still, both of these 
kinds of law, the natural and the divine, derive from a single source—the eternal law. 
For Aquinas, the natural law is said to be “nothing other than a participation in the 
eternal law by the rational creature” (ST 1a2ae 91.2). In fact, both the natural law and 
divine law participate in the eternal law. The eternal law is God’s Providence, 
understood by Aquinas as the idea in Divine wisdom (divinae sapientiae) that directs all 
acts and movements (ST 1a2ae 93.1). A rational creature (rationalis creatura) thus 
participates in the eternal law “by providing for itself and others” (ST 1a2ae 91.2). This 
relationship between the natural law and divine law sharing in the eternal law illustrates 
the model of Aquinas’s metaphysics of participation.  
To illustrate this relationship and to support my argument about truth construed as 
law in natural law traditions, let us consider the following statement by St. Thomas: “For 
all knowledge of the truth is an irradiation or participation (irradiatio et participatio) of 
the eternal law which is the unchanging truth (veritas incommutabilis) (ST 1a2ae 93.2).” 
Evident in this passage, Aquinas equates the eternal law with the unchanging truth. The 
eternal law refers therefore to the very essence (essentia) of God. As such, I want to 
 
59 Eugene F. Rogers, Jr., “Aquinas on the Natural Law and Virtues in Biblical Context: Homosexuality as a 
Test Case,” Journal of Religious Ethics 27, vol. 1 (1999): 40. 
60 Hall, 44. 
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designate it as the constitutive truth of the Thomistic natural law tradition. It is a truth 
that “no one can fully comprehend” because it precedes the creation of natural law and 
extends beyond its limitations infinitely (Ibid.). 
 
Authority in the Natural Law Traditions  
The question of authority or sources, a facet of the normative dimension in our 
approach, is central to our concept of a natural law tradition. Our hermeneutical 
standpoint discourages deriving authority from a metaphysical or cosmological 
worldview that is characteristic of premodern cultures. In other words, no account of 
natural law should be taken merely on self-evident truths. What is self-evident in these 
natural law traditions is always situated within the rationality of the tradition and its 
attendant sources. That, of course, in no way implies that the natural law accounts should 
be kept out of public discourse. This irruption of the natural law in public discourse, 
because it is derived from a constitutive truth that is beyond measure, has no set limits on 
human dignity and what it can challenge. In the next chapter I will illustrate how 
reasonable claims to natural law can be made across traditions by way of normative 
discourse.  
In this section, I would like to consider the origin and proper locus of authority for 
natural law in both traditions. Authority within traditions, according to MacIntyre, is 
“conferred upon certain texts and certain voices.”61 Let us consider what these voices and 
texts might be in the Theravada and Thomistic traditions. Locating natural law ethics 
within the narrative context of sacred texts legitimated by an authoritative voice is a 
characteristic of these traditions. This section will further illustrate the tradition-
 
61 MacIntyre (1988), 354. 
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dependent rationality of these traditions, revelation or insight as a historical phenomenon, 
and the claim that natural law is a cultural construct in Novak’s sense of the term. 
 
Buddha, Pariyatti, and Pāli Canon 
As noted, natural law in the Theravāda tradition is identified specifically with the 
Dhamma, or the “Teaching,” of the Buddha. Unlike natural law in the Thomistic 
tradition, which is an intrinsic quality of rational creatures, Dhamma in the Theravāda 
tradition is the law of nature that constitutes all living things. It functions as the 
constitutive truth and cosmic law in the Theravāda tradition whereas the eternal law (i.e., 
Divine wisdom) is the constitutive truth for Aquinas. Dhamma, as Payutto has noted, is 
both natural truth and natural law. Therefore, it is not a supernatural reality like the 
eternal law for Aquinas that no one, save God Himself, and the blessed in heaven, can 
fully comprehend. In the Theravāda tradition, the figure of the Buddha and the arahant 
refer to those awakened ones who have fully penetrated the Dhamma in this life by 
achieving nibbāna (enlightenment).  
As the constitutive truth and natural law, Dhamma “provides the measure against 
which acts are judged, though each case is viewed as a response to the infinite variety of 
circumstances” that confront the free choices made by persons.62 Dhamma, in the sense 
we are using it, is the all-encompassing truth or the “cosmic principle of truth”63 about 
the laws of reality that is to be penetrated through insight (paññā) and the spiritual 
practice of vipassana-meditation. It is not a principle in the sense of mere propositions or 
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abstractions. It is an experiential and empirical truth that is corporeal inasmuch as it is 
cognitive. The following excerpt from the Pāli Suttas (or Discourses) of the Buddha 
illustrates the embodied nature of Dhamma: “He who sees the Dhamma sees me, and he 
who sees me sees the Dhamma” (SN III.120).64 The singularity of the Buddha and the 
Dhamma serve as the authoritative nexus of the Theravāda tradition. Theravāda 
practitioners pay homage to the Buddha for his “breakthrough” and “vision of the 
Dhamma” and his compassion to return to society to teach the Noble Path (SN 13:1; II 
133-34). Thus, it is his voice that preaches the Dhamma, and therefore his voice that is 
granted authority because he has attained special insight.  
Within the Theravāda tradition, the term pariyatti is used to designate the 
“authoritative teaching” or the “words of the Buddha” pertaining to his insight into the 
true Dhamma.65 According to commentarial tradition in Theravāda Buddhism, pariyatti 
originally was in reference to the discourses “heard from the mouth of the Buddha and 
passed down orally.”66 Therefore, its purpose was to designate the “official” spoken 
Dhamma of the Buddha. Due to the Indian cultural context of Gotama Buddha, this task 
of preserving the truth was necessary. We noted earlier that before his enlightenment, 
Gotama tread various dharma for six years in order to discover the answer to the problem 
of suffering and impermanence. During his quest, Gotama studied the different dharma 
under teachers like Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta and on both occasions said, 
“Not being satisfied with that dharma, disappointed with it, I left” (MN 26: I 160-67). 
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Other religious paths were also available in this period that included the Brahmanical 
tradition of Hinduism and the Jain followers of Mahāvīra.  
This demonstrates that there were many meanings of dharma in the Buddha’s 
context occasioned by the Hindu usage of that term. The word dharma is derived from the 
Sanskrit root, dhr, meaning “to support,” or “to maintain.”67 In the Hindu worldview, 
dharma refers to the structure regulating the cosmic, social, and moral orders that all 
operate on different levels having different roles and expectations. In contrast to the 
singularity of the Dhamma taught by the Buddha, Hindu dharma is a plurality. According 
to one scholar, it “resists the application of categorical and universal laws.”68 That is not 
to say that no attempts have been made in Hinduism to establish universal rules of 
conduct. Consider, for example, the universal significance of ahimsā (non-harmfulness) 
defined in the Mahābārata.69 But in the Indian imagination of the Buddha’s time, 
conduct appropriate to one’s social position, gender, and age was the normative practice, 
and it was expressed through the caste structure. This translates into various kinds of 
dharma corresponding to caste or vocation (varnadharma), womanhood (strīdharma), 
and stage in life (āśhramadharma).70 Therefore, identifying the authoritative teaching of 
the Buddha’s insight in terms of pariyatti was central to the early followers to distinguish 
it from other dharma.  
Although there are a variety of meanings for Dhamma in Buddhism, we noted that 
they all point to the singular reality of the truths and laws of nature: suffering, 
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impermanence, no-self, kamma, and dependent origination. The law of kamma, which 
regulates “natural justice,”71 produces pleasant or negative consequences based on an 
agent’s intentional actions (cetanā) through mind, body, and speech (AN III.415). Yet its 
effect is contingent upon whether or not the agent remains in the wheel of rebirth known 
as samsāra. Earlier, I discussed the Buddha’s distinction between two levels of insight: 
worldly (lokiya) and world-transcending (lokuttara). The enlightened Buddha, having 
uprooted the fundamental twofold problem of craving (tanhā) and ignorance (avijjā), no 
longer lived according to worldly samsāra and its characteristics of suffering and kamma. 
This is the level of awareness that defines the world-transcending Buddhadhamma.  
Pariyatti, as the authoritative teaching for the Buddhadhamma, required a 
medium of expression. Originally, this might have referred to oral tradition. Evidence for 
this claim is presented in the Dhammaññu Sutta, where the Buddha responds to a 
disciple’s question about how a monk is one with a sense of Dhamma:  
There is the case where a monk knows the Dhamma: dialogues, narratives of 
mixed prose and verse, explanations, spontaneous exclamations, quotations, birth 
stories, amazing events, questions and answer sessions… its because he knows 
the Dhamma that he is said to be one with the Dhamma (AN 7.64 & IV.113).72 
 
Knowing the Dhamma, according to this passage, is made possible through the 
penetration of narrative and speech acts. This illustrates its location in oral authoritative 
teaching and experiential learning. The term pariyatti eventually became synonymous 
with “religious texts”73 and when rendered as pariyattidhamma, “it means dhamma that is 
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be thoroughly learned, memorized, and remembered.”74 Its function was so crucial that, 
according to Sinhalese commentary, the disappearance of the Buddhadhamma “will not 
occur so long as pariyatti remains.”75 Two mediums of expression were therefore central 
in extending pariyatti: the Pāli Canon and the Sangha. 
The Buddha challenged the classical caste structure by establishing a social 
institution according to the Dhamma known as the Sangha. This religious order was a 
composite of monks (bhikkhus) and nuns (bhikkhunis).76 For many outcastes, women, and 
members of the lower varnas, the Sangha offered a religious refuge and community of 
liberation hitherto unavailable. Its purpose was so crucial in Buddhist life that taking 
refuge in the Sangha was identified as part of the Triple Gem (tiratna), along with the 
Buddha and the Dhamma. The Sangha was always situated within the larger Buddhist 
community of lay followers. Monks and nuns required different observances than one 
another, and both had more codes than the laity. This dual structure of monastic and lay 
lifestyles embedded itself in the Buddhist social imaginary and translated, to some 
degree, into two ways of comporting to existence: the way of pleasurable rebirth 
(kamma) and the way of nibbāna. Both lifestyles were dependent on each other: the 
monks and nuns offered training and education in the Dhamma, and the laity exercised 
the public virtue of generosity (dāna) to sustain the Sangha and acquire merit. 
The Pāli Canon, or Tipitika, descended from a collection of ancient Theravāda 
texts that were composed as early as 350 BCE.77 There are “Three Baskets” or divisions to 
the canonical literature. The first two include the Suttas (Discourses of the Buddha) and 
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the Vinaya monastic codes. Among the Discourses, the various Nikāyas contain over five 
thousand individual sutras all pertaining to the Buddha’s pariyatti.78 The Vinaya texts 
define the religious observances and moral precepts for monks and nuns, which include 
the 227 rules of conduct known as the Pātimokkha. The last division, the Abhidhammic 
scholastic treatises, was gathered approximately a century after the other two baskets. 
These writings are an extrapolation of the Dhamma taught by the Buddha by emphasizing 
the emptiness of all psychological and physical events with analytical rigor and technical 
precision. The reification of the notion of Dhamma as a result of the teachings expanding 
textually and institutionally is said to be one of the concerns that inspired this literature.79 
Thus the Abhidhammic philosophy renders the Buddhist cosmology as a continuous 
process of psycho-physical occurrences to refute the tendency of construing reality in 
terms of ontological substances.  
All of the canonical literature, especially the Suttas, represents the narrative 
context of Dhamma in a way similar to Novak’s Scriptural foundation of natural law 
ethics in Judaism. The true Dhamma, secured by pariyatti, and expounded in the Pāli 
Canon and taught by the Sangha, is the experiential matrix of special insight into natural 
law. This is important because it demonstrates the contextual setting of natural law and 
the limits of its claims on others who have not received the “gift of Dhamma” 
(dhammadānam) (Dh 354). In the next chapter, we will consider how the life story of the 
Buddha in conjunction with his teachings illustrates the different levels of insight that can 
serve as model for natural law discourse across traditions and within the Therāvada 
tradition.  
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God, Sacra Doctrina, and Scripture 
We have already identified the eternal law in the Thomistic account as the 
constitutive truth ordering all particular truths of which the natural law would consist. 
The eternal law, as Divine wisdom, is the source of providential order for all creation that 
aims to return creation to itself (ST 1a2ae 91.1). It is God who imprints the natural law in 
creation through “the light of natural reason” and it is God who reveals the higher aim 
(altiori modo) of man’s supernatural vocation within the fabric of creation by means of 
the divine law (ST 1a2ae 91.4). In the Thomistic tradition, the natural law is the artifice of 
God and thereby finds its resources within the context of theological reflection.  
This has not been the position of proponents of the “new natural law theory” who 
claim to uncover self-evident truths from pure practical reason’s grasp of “basic goods” 
without turning to metaphysics.80 To their credit, these thinkers admit a departure from 
the Thomistic tradition and it is evident in their disagreement with Aquinas on this point:  
Human reason by itself is not the rule of things, but principles naturally instilled 
in man are certain rules and measures of all things to be done by man, and of 
these things natural reason is the rule and measures although it is not the measure 
of things that come from nature (ST 1a2ae 91.3). 
 
In other words, a concept of pure natural reason as the source of rule and measure is not 
Aquinas’s claim. Rather, human reason, not “by itself,” but within the matrix of the 
eternal law has its proper locus of authority. The eternal law therefore is the infinite 
measure of the natural law. Such a claim secures the idea of an infinite measure of law 
originating in the eternal law that can check the measure of any law.  
 
80 See Hall for a brief review of the Grisez-Finnis theory of natural law, 16-19. 
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This brings us to Aquinas’s notion of human law (lex humana). As one scholar 
puts it, human law is the “law of specific communities.”81 Human law works in tandem 
with the natural law to extend its precepts, mainly through jurisprudence or legal 
reasoning. But the issue now arises, what if a human law is unjust? I turn to Aquinas’s 
point: “the law of the Holy Spirit is superior to every law humanly established” (ST 1a2ae 
96.5 r2). As such, there is no better instruction of moral law than the teaching of God, 
which is the basis of authority for natural law thinking in the Thomistic tradition. This is 
why it can be said that Aquinas locates natural law in sacra doctrina, or “Divine 
Teaching.”82  
In the opening question of the Summa theologiae, Aquinas describes his major 
work, which was never completed, as a science of sacra doctrina. He understands sacra 
doctrina as a higher science “established on principles revealed by God” to complement 
philosophical science for the sake of human salvation: “It was therefore necessary that 
besides the philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred science 
learned through revelation” (ST 1.1-2) The aim of sacra doctrina is to demonstrate the 
complementarity between faith and reason while maintaining the authority of revelation.  
In the case of natural law, even though it belongs to all rational creatures and 
contains precepts that are self-evident (per se nota), it requires the authority of sacra 
doctrina from within the tradition to maintain its coherence and legitimacy. This goes for 
all the precepts of the natural law. In other words, the natural law tradition of Aquinas 
safeguards an account of an immutable natural moral law inherent in all human beings. 
 
81 Ibid., 41. 
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Yet although the natural law participates in the eternal law, it is not necessary for the 
natural law to participate in the divine law. That is because Aquinas grants Aristotle’s 
account of the moral life a legitimate place within Divine Providence. The autonomy of 
the natural law is evident in the Summa because it has a kind of permanent status in 
nature that precedes the gift of grace: “grace (gratia) is more effective than nature, yet 
nature is more essential to man, therefore, more permanent” (1a2ae 94.6 r2). As such, 
those people exercising the natural law outside of the religious tradition are protected 
from any possible religious authoritarianism masquerading as divine law because they are 
still viewed as participants in the eternal law.  
A Thomistic natural law tradition, in theory, approves and protects other 
communities of rational persons that may be outside of the divine law. The sacra 
doctrina is therefore the locus of authority for God’s voice in a living Thomistic natural 
law tradition. Church leaders, theologians, and everyday saints, all contribute to this 
living tradition by protecting the sanctity of the eternal law on earth as the following 
excerpt from the Roman Catholic encyclical by Pope John Paul II shows: 
Within Tradition, the authentic interpretation of the Lord’s law develops, with the 
help of the Holy Spirit. The same Spirit who is at the origin of the Revelation of 
Jesus’ commandments and teachings, guarantees that they will be reverently 
preserved, faithfully expounded and correctly applied in different times and 
places (VS § 27). 
 
If sacra doctrina represents the authoritative teaching given by God—the voice— 
in a living Thomistic natural law tradition, then Scripture would be the textual authority 
of natural law. Some Christian ethicists like Stanley Hauerwas and Richard McCormick 
claim that Scripture and natural law represent two distinct sources for ethical reflection.83 
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For Aquinas, natural law and Scripture are inseparable. Thomas locates natural law in 
sacra doctrina, of which Scripture is a most faithful guide, thereby illustrating the 
narrative and divinely revealed context of natural law. Scripture, but also human scholars, 
represent the auctoritates of Thomas’s concept of natural law. 
The purpose of locating natural law in narrative for Aquinas is for argumentation 
and evidence. I noted earlier that the divine law is expressed through the Biblical 
narrative of the Old and New Laws or Testaments. This authority, originating in 
revelation, is “decisive” over the authority granted to human authors such as “the 
Philosopher” Aristotle and church fathers like Augustine and Jerome.84 So the particular 
truth of the human auctoritas, of whom Aquinas may not always agree with, must be 
measured against the constitutive truth of God’s word revealed in Scripture. The Biblical 
narrative, and specifically the Pauline narrative in the Letter to the Romans, is “the 
storied context in which Aquinas places assertions of natural law.”85 It is in this epistle of 
St. Paul that the most authoritative claims for the natural law are made. Here are a couple 
of examples: 
Ever since the creation of the world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible 
though they are, have been understood and seen through the things that he has 
made. [1:20] 
When Gentiles, who do not possess the law, do by nature (phusei) what the law 
requires, these, though not having the law, are a law to themselves. They show 
that what the law requires is written on their hearts, to which their own conscience 
(syndeiseos) also bears witness; and their conflicting thoughts will accuse or 
perhaps excuse them. [2:14-15] 
 
In the second passage, I have italicized two words from the ancient Greek, 
“nature” and “conscience,” to highlight the significance of Scripture for the authoritative 
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basis of Aquinas’s view of natural law. The Greek term, synedeisos, functions as a 
cognate of the Latin synderesis referring to a natural capacity for moral discernment. 
These excerpts given in the context of Paul’s account of the historical fall of the Gentiles 
into idolatry fits into Aquinas’s narrative account of the natural law that begins with the 
Old Law and is completed with the New Law.86  
The Law of Moses, according to Aquinas, although given as a divine law, was an 
imperfect law in the sense that it only predisposed Jews to the arrival of Christ (ST 1a2ae 
98.2). Its work was to teach humanity about the natural law and prefigure the Messiah.87 
The supernatural vocation of humanity is then revealed in the work of Christ, the New 
Law according to grace and charity, of which Paul is the main expositor. This is the basic 
narrative of Aquinas’s Biblical account of natural law.  
Locating the natural law within the sacra doctrina and its expression through the 
narrative of Scripture, a move faithful to Aquinas, corresponds to our aim of identifying 
natural law as a cultural construct. Novak’s model also gives credence to natural law 
traditions by offering them a vital role within the functioning of a healthy democracy, a 
theme that will conclude our investigation. It simultaneously places necessary limits on 
the claims of natural law traditions since they exist as one among an entire network of 
historical communities thus avoiding any possible authoritarianism. In the next section, I 
consider how it is that these natural law traditions can engage in normative discourse with 
other traditions in the hermeneutic project of mutual illumination or shared insight and 
consider how it is that one can pursue the constitutive truth within one’s own tradition.   
 
 
86 See Rogers for a thorough discussion of this as it relates to homosexuality. 
87 Hall, 48. 
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Chapter Three: Natural Law Discourse 
 
 
My argument at this point is that the natural law ethics of the Theravāda and 
Thomistic traditions fit our concept of a natural law tradition formulated through the 
work of Macintyre and Novak from our hermeneutical standpoint. I have attempted to 
demonstrate this by focusing primarily on the normative dimension of our 
multidimensional model. This led us to consider the authoritative basis and narrative 
context in both traditions of natural law ethics to show they function as a cultural 
construct. In this chapter, I focus on the comparative and ontological dimensions of 
natural law ethics. My claim is that these natural law traditions contain analogous 
structures for normative discourse that have the ability to bridge with other cultures and 
traditions. Natural law must be located within the rationality of one tradition among many 
so that it can avoid making totalistic claims. And this, I argue, is compatible with these 
traditions anyway since they possess the conceptual resources for recognizing moral 
diversity and the autonomy of other traditions. These natural law traditions are also able 
to identify common moral claims and adjudicate moral differences across traditions to 
avoid incommensurability. 
In the Journal of Religious Ethics article, “Is Natural Law a Border Concept 
between Judaism and Christianity?” David Novak compares the natural law ethics of 
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Christianity and Judaism in order to find common ground between the traditions.1 He 
claims that Christianity and Judaism “must locate an ethical border” around themselves 
and then between each other and some third tradition.2 He appeals to the other Abrahamic 
tradition, Islam, as a potential dialogue partner. To delineate the parameters of dialogue, 
Novak designates two categories of normative natural law discourse that I will employ: 
special and general.3 In Novak’s Jewish account, the former category refers to the special 
revelation of Judaism, i.e., the Mosaic Law that establishes the Jewish people in history 
as a community chosen by God. Speaking as a Jewish theologian, Novak says, “that 
special revelation enables us to accept God as the immediate source of our communal 
life.”4 The latter category refers to general revelation. I noted earlier that for Novak, this 
designates the Noahide law that God established with all human beings. Discourse on the 
level of general revelation is a minimalist account concerning the basic norms or ethical 
commonality between traditions. It is a regulatory principle that “only offers rights, not 
the good.”5 In other words, its aim is to shape the “overlapping consensus” among the 
plurality of voices in the public sphere. General revelation thereby maintains the 
important status of historical communities within the democratic ethos as a precondition 
for justice to prevent religious traditions from being ‘kept at the doorstep’ by doctrinaire 
secularists.6
 
1 David Novak, “Is Natural Law a Border Concept between Judaism and Christianity?”, Journal of 
Religious Ethics 32, no.2 (2004), 237-254. 
2 Novak (2004), 250. 
3 I should also note that Robert Merrihew Adams’ essay, “Religious Ethics in a Pluralistic Society,” also 
uses these categories in Prospects for a Common Morality, ed. Gene Outka and John P. Reeder, Jr. 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
4 Novak (2004), 245 
5 Ibid., 246. 
6 Ibid. 
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I believe that Novak has set the parameters for two modes of discourse in an 
intriguing way among the monotheistic natural law traditions. But a shortcoming in his 
work is that he limits this dialogue to monotheistic faiths. I have intended to address this 
limitation in Novak by considering how a Buddhist natural law tradition might fit in these 
categories of discourse and participate in the dialogue. Let us consider these categories in 
more detail. 
The special category is specifically aimed at discourse within the tradition and the 
general category aimed at discourse across traditions. Broadly speaking, the special 
category pertains specifically to “theological” claims whereas the general category is 
concerned with ethical claims.7  Each mode of discourse therefore has a specific function 
in the development of that tradition. But that does not exclude the possibility of 
overlapping in these categories. For example, that God is the benevolent creator of the 
world is a special revelation claim that all monotheistic traditions share and are able to 
discuss. This is not properly the task of comparative religious ethics. As we explore this 
normative dimension of discourse in the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions, I am using 
the special category to refer specifically to the Buddhadhamma and the divine law.  
The general category (or general knowledge), which isolates a language for 
comparison with other traditions, refers to the kammic law in the Theravāda tradition and 
the lex naturalis (natural law) in Aquinas. To be consistent with our traditions in 
question, general knowledge and special revelation categories are assigned to the 
Thomistic tradition whereas general knowledge and special insight categories are used 
                                                 
7 The field of Comparative Theology seems more adept and appropriate to engage the question of ultimate 
truth claims across religious traditions. This is not befitting of the task of Comparative Religious Ethics, 
which primarily engages other traditions on the level of ethics. 
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for the Theravāda tradition. Within each tradition, the special and general categories of 
natural law discourse are not separate. Both categories are dependent on the other. There 
is no divine law without lex naturalis just as there is no realization of the Buddhadhamma 
without having first realized the law of kamma and the suffering characterizing samsāra. 
This truism secures the autonomy of other traditions. Conversely, lex naturalis requires 
divine law for its supernatural fulfillment whereas kamma and suffering can only be 
extinguished by penetrating the Buddhadhamma. Thus enlightenment takes place within 
existence, or samsāra. Grace transforms nature in this world.  
Lastly, I claim that these modes of natural law discourse can answer the two 
challenges of relativism and perspectivism posed by the post-Enlightenment skepticism 
of a genealogist such as Nietzsche. The relativist position denies “that rational debate 
between and rational choice among rival traditions is possible.”8 Meanwhile, the 
perspectivist outlook “puts in question the possibility of making any truth claims from 
within any one tradition.”9 The normative discourse of natural law traditions are 
structured in such a way that can meet these two challenges.  
I argue that general discourse opens up a path of mutual illumination between 
traditions thus demonstrating the reasonableness of moral claims across traditions. 
General discourse locates what these traditions purport to have in common with other 
religions and cultures thereby inviting the possibility of shared insight. It also allows the 
possibility for moral divergence to surface that can lead to adjudication across traditions, 
if need be. These factors can respond to the relativist challenge. On the other hand, 
through special discourse with other practitioners of one’s home tradition or any other 
                                                 
8 MacIntyre (1988), 352. 
9 Ibid. 
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tradition sharing special claims, one can pursue the truth from within their particular 
horizon. The special category designates the unique revelation or insight available to 
religious practitioners regarding truth claims that is internally debated within the 
tradition. It concerns more theological and speculative matters. As such, this mode of 
discourse can respond to the perspectivist challenge.  
 
General Category 
Having a language of normative discourse between traditions on the level of 
ethics is a crucial feature of natural law traditions and it is central to our method of 
comparative ethical inquiry. I am claiming that this structural similarity in both the 
Thomistic and Theravāda traditions can serve as a bridge with other cultures and as a 
means for different religious traditions to join together on matters of shared insight, 
especially in regard to ethical commonalities. This feature responds to the challenge 
posed by the relativist claiming that no intelligible assessment or rational moral claims 
can be made across cultures. These natural law traditions recognize that a certain level of 
knowledge regarding the ultimate truth and higher law is available to all human beings by 
virtue of their natural faculties. That kind of natural knowledge or natural wisdom is 
possible because the constitutive truth is the basis of reality. Using the thought of Robert 
Merrihew Adams, general knowledge denotes, “facts about life and the world that are 
generally accessible to human beings, and through tendencies of belief and feeling that 
are natural to human beings are at least widely and commonly present in people of 
different places, times, and cultures.”10 
                                                 
10 Adams, 100. 
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This is the parameter of general discourse for natural law traditions. I have 
already suggested that each tradition uses a category for discriminating the special and 
the general. For the Thomistic tradition, natural law (lex naturalis) in tandem with human 
law illustrates the potential for common morality accessible to all rational persons. In the 
Theravāda tradition, we have noted that observing the law of kamma, an aspect of 
mundane (lokiya) awareness, is general knowledge available to all persons regardless of 
dharma. In keeping with the claim that natural law is situated in a narrative context, we 
will consider the narrative of Gotama Buddha’s life as recounted by the Pāli Canon and 
also consider the interpretation of contemporary scholars. This can afford us a working 
model for the categories of general knowledge and special insight within the Theravāda 
tradition.  
 
Law of Kamma  
I noted earlier the observation made by Frank Reynolds that Theravāda Buddhism 
has two cosmologies with distinct proximal aims: the samsaric cosmology aimed at 
pleasurable rebirth and the Buddhic cosmology aimed at enlightenment.11 For the 
Theravāda scholar Harvey Aronson, these distinctions translate into the kammic and 
nibbanic paths. The two cosmologies and paths formulated by these scholars, which is 
derived from the Pāli Canon and ethnography, provide the framework for delineating the 
general and special modes of discourse in the Theravāda tradition. It is important to note 
that for both scholars, the distinguishable cosmologies or paths are not fully separated so 
as to define two different religions. This was an inaccuracy recorded by a number of 
                                                 
11 Reynolds and Schofer, 121-22. 
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anthropologists of Theravāda Buddhism who concluded that these separate paths are 
expressed through the social institutions of the monastic and lay lifestyles.12  
Instead, the mundane (lokiya) and supramundane (lokuttara) levels of reality 
interpenetrate one another so that the two levels are “overlapping cosmologies.” As 
Aronson puts it, “The mundane serves as the matrix for the transcendent.”13 Aronson 
echoes, in a sense, Aquinas’s model of grace presupposing and transforming nature, by 
pointing out that the nibbanic path of liberation from rebirth presupposes and transforms 
the kammic path of ethical activity.14 The samsaric cosmology that is governed by the 
law of kamma is by no means unique to the Theravāda tradition but is an appropriation of 
ancient Hindu cosmology and ethics. According to Reynolds, the general knowledge of 
this cosmology is echoed by the First Noble Truth of the Buddha: that all existence is 
suffering.15 Samsāra is characterized by suffering or unsatisfactoriness, with the law of 
kamma regulating the favorable or unfavorable outcomes and rebirths according to one’s 
intentional actions.  
Having noted the distinguishable but inseparable paths, it is the case that the 
Buddha often associated the kammic path with the laity as is evident in the following 
verse to a householder from the Anguttara Nikāya: “Four things lead to a family man’s 
welfare and happiness in the future life. What four? Accomplishment in faith [in the 
Buddha’s enlightenment], moral discipline, generosity (dāna), and wisdom” (8:54; IV 
281-85). The first three of these qualities are virtues and precepts that characterize 
                                                 
12 See Aronson. 
13 Aronson, 34. 
14 Ibid., 35. 
15 Reynolds and Schofer, 121. 
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wholesome moral action. But the last quality, wisdom, should not be confused with the 
wisdom or insight into “the true nature of things” achieved by the enlightened Buddha.  
In this discourse Gotama Buddha is specifically referring to the wisdom attained 
when a householder “sees the arising and passing away of phenomena” (Ibid.). It is this 
level of knowledge, along with faith, morality, and generosity that can eventually lead to 
the cessation of suffering, but proximally only leads to a pleasurable rebirth. The level of 
reality for the householder is governed by kammic law, which belongs to the law of 
nature, but does not encompass the fullness of Dhamma. The householder has attained 
the “right view” (sammā ditthi) on the mundane (lokiya) level that is the source of 
wholesome actions leading to fortunate rebirth.16 This level of kammic insight delineates 
the mode of general discourse in the Theravāda tradition. 
We can also locate this distinction between two levels of insight in the Buddha’s 
retelling of his knowledge before and after enlightenment. In the following excerpt, he 
states that he was aware of two out of the ‘three characteristics of existence’ (tilakkhana) 
before nibbāna: 
Before my enlightenment… it occurred to me: ‘Whatever pleasure and joy there is 
in this world, this is the gratification in the world; that the world is impermanent 
(anicca), bound up with suffering (dukkha), and subject to change, this is the 
danger in the world; the removal and abandoning of desire (tanhā) and lust (rāga) 
for the world, this is the escape from the world’ (AN 3:101 §§1-2; I 258-59). 
 
The Buddha identified two characteristics—suffering and impermanence—that 
led to his renunciation and search for the truth.17 This pursuit was triggered by his 
experience of the passing sights of aging, disease, and death. His partial insight into the 
                                                 
16 Bodhi, 147. 
17 Joanna Macy, Mutual Causality in Buddhism and General Systems Theory: The Dharma of Natural 
Systems (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991), 40. 
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true Dhamma at this stage in his life demonstrates that this general knowledge can be 
achieved as a householder, the stage he inhabited when he encountered the passing sights.  
The Theravāda tradition makes no theoretical distinction between householders 
who are Buddhists and non-Buddhist householders. Everyone belonging to this lifestyle 
is capable of understanding this level of general insight into the Dhamma. That is not to 
say that Theravāda Buddhist lay persons are restricted to this general insight. On the 
contrary, the proliferation of insight-meditation among laity and the reinterpretation of 
Sangha as a fourfold institution comprised of monks, nuns, laymen, and laywomen attest 
to this.18 Understanding the kammic law and the truths of impermanence and suffering 
define the criteria of general knowledge available to all persons open to perception, 
regardless of background. In support of this view, Buddhadasa suggested that all religions 
should be able to avoid conflict and disagreement because they agree on the problem of 
dukkha, the “central truth to humanity,” and are able to at least point to its solution in 
Dhamma.19 In the next section, I shall consider how the Buddha’s special insight leading 
to his enlightenment functions as the mode of special discourse. 
 
Lex Naturalis 
Locating the general and special modes of discourse in Aquinas’s thought poses 
no challenge because of his synthesis of two seemingly incommensurable traditions. His 
Aristotelian viewpoint, as well as Scriptural authority, shapes his sense of the natural law 
(lex naturalis) residing in the faculty of reason. The natural law that is grasped by the 
habit of synderesis and compelled by natural inclination is the starting point of general 
                                                 
18 Keown (2004).  
19 Buddhadasa, 168. 
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discourse from a Thomistic perspective. Aquinas recognized the autonomy of other 
traditions early in his life. His exposure to Muslim thinkers in Naples and enjoyment of 
Aristotle during his castigation showed him that natural reason transcended the 
boundaries of traditions, religious or pagan. Although special discourse in terms of 
trinitarian revelation was not possible with the tawhīd doctrine of Islam20 and the 
philosopher’s impersonal god of metaphysics, general discourse on account of natural 
reason was “not only possible but imperative.”21 For Aquinas, these other traditions 
might lack the specific revelation that transforms nature, but there is no denying these 
traditions their inherent dignity because the natural law participates in the eternal law. 
 Earlier, we considered the various dimensions of natural law. The primary precept 
of ‘doing good, avoiding evil’ and the first principles of human acts like ‘do no harm’ 
and ‘respect property of others’ were known by nature absolutely and universally. 
Natural law, at this level, cannot be abolished from human hearts. These fundamental 
precepts of the natural law serve as a starting point for the moral life because they 
provide direction toward the goods of human nature.22 I noted that Aquinas describes the 
natural goods as the common good (bonum commune) that includes preservation of life, 
sexual intercourse and education, religious truth and social living. The common good is 
not merely pursued because natural reason commands it so. A moral agent pursues the 
common good because she also has a natural inclination or desire that is an internal 
                                                 
20 The term tawhīd means “oneness of God” and illustrates the strict monotheism of Islam that considers 
the doctrine of the trinity as associating partners with God. I would also note that Aquinas makes this 
distinction between oneness of God as a mode of general discourse pertaining to natural reason and the 
trinity as a subject of special discourse or revelation. See ST 1a2ae 99.2. 
21 Kate McCarthy, “Reckoning with Religious Difference: Models of Interreligious Moral Dialogue,” in 
Explorations in Global Ethics: Comparative Religious Ethics and Interreligious Dialogue, ed. Sumner B. 
Twiss and Bruce Grelle (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000), 86. 
22 Hall, 42. 
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principle of action. Therefore, natural law is a twofold constitution of synderesis and 
inclinationes.23 But this is not enough to attain what the natural law intends. Therefore, 
natural law requires application to particular situations for the sake of obtaining natural 
goods.  
 It is in this application that natural law finds its deeper expression and diversity 
among communities. Application of the natural law in a general mode is the work of 
human law and virtues. Human law, I referenced, is the law of specific communities, and 
it provides the rules or general conclusions for natural law that can be applied to specific 
circumstances. ‘Do no harm’ may be a first principle of moral agency, but human law 
determines the particular rule that it is illegal to harm one’s own child. In Aquinas’s 
thought, a human law is a secondary precept: “detailed… conclusions (quasi 
conclusiones) following closely from the first principles” (ST 1a2ae 94.6). As such, this 
type of precept allows for historical contingency and social customs to shape its 
expression. Aquinas identifies three possible factors that can prevent secondary precepts 
from extending the common good of the natural law: evil passions, depraved customs, or 
corrupt habits (Ibid., r3). He uses the Roman example of legitimating theft and robbery as 
described in Caesar’s Gallic Wars to explain this. The depraved customs prevented 
Caesar’s army from clearly apprehending knowledge of the first principle of respecting 
another’s property. Lacking a clear apprehension of the general principles of natural law 
because of flawed customs and passions makes unjust actions possible. These unjust 
actions can then find disordered expression in unjust human law.  
 
23 Ibid., 99. 
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 The true purpose of human law is to bring about the aim of natural law, which is 
the common good of a society and regulate relations among society (ST 1a2ae 96.1). 
Moreover, human law “intends to bring men to virtue,” but it can only do so in a limited 
way because too many precepts might discourage imperfect people from civil stability 
altogether (ST 1a2ae 96.2 r2). The social virtues that the human law can bring about in 
society include justice and peace (ST 1a2ae 96.3). Essential to the application of 
secondary precepts or human law to particular situations is the virtue of prudentia. It is a 
virtue that “learns from the past and present about the future” (ST 2a2ae 47.1). Therefore, 
it is a virtue that demonstrates that knowledge of the natural law is dynamic because it is 
inextricably time-bound and historical.24 Prudence, located in reason, secures the right 
means in a particular circumstance to draw one closer to the proper good. It is a virtue 
that is necessary for the operation of all virtues, both natural ones and those supernatural 
virtues infused by the grace of the Spirit.  
 Prudence qualifies as one of Aquinas’s natural or moral virtues available to all 
moral agents possessing general knowledge of the natural law. And this is important 
especially when one considers that “it is moral activity that is the door through which we 
enter to reach the contemplation in which wisdom engages” (DQVirtGen 1 r4). Similar to 
the Buddhist example of the mundane as the matrix for the supramundane, Aquinas views 
moral agency guided by prudence as the door to contemplation and wisdom. Aquinas 
never says that prudence or reason alone is sufficient because nature and reason need the 
perfection of grace and revelation. But the natural law as a “participated theonomy” in 
the eternal law shows that it is a precondition for the divine law, and therefore 
 
24 Hall, 38-40. 
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autonomous in this regard (VS §41). Were it not so, the Thomistic natural law tradition 
embodied in the Roman Catholic Church today would not make the claim that other 
religious traditions, which do not embrace revelation, “often reflect a ray of that Truth 
which enlightens all men.”25  
 
Special Category 
In any tradition, discourse over truth claims or the goods which constitute it 
belong to the very health of that tradition. For MacIntyre, “traditions, when vital, embody 
continuities in conflict.”26 The debates in medieval Paris between Augustinians and the 
rising Aristotelian thinkers is one such example. St. Bonaventure’s condemnation of 
Aristotelianism and Siger de Brabant’s reluctant submission to orthodoxy over any kind 
of philosophical challenge to theology attest to this in Aquinas’s period.27 This debate 
and dialectic of seemingly incommensurable traditions is embodied in the writings of St. 
Thomas. The argumentative technique of the Summa, of resolving conflicts between 
competing auctoritas, belongs to the oeuvre’s brilliance and demonstrates the 
“rationality” of the tradition. This highlights one of the crucial features of the Thomistic 
tradition and tradition in general according to MacIntyre: “…certain radical 
disagreements may be both recognized and rationally overcome within the context of any 
kind of tradition.”28
The dialectical enterprise is the basis for the rationality of any tradition. 
Moreover, “implicit in any rationality of such enquiry [e.g. Aquinas] there is indeed a 
 
25 Nostra aetate 
26 MacIntyre (1984), 222. 
27 Ibid. (1990), 112. 
28 Ibid., 118. 
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conception of final truth.”29 A similar enterprise is reflected throughout the entire Pāli 
Suttas, where the Buddha is constantly debating and discoursing with householders, 
Brahmins, and monk disciples about the Dhamma. Within three centuries of the Buddha’s 
death (parinibbāna), eighteen schools of sectarian Buddhism had already formed based 
on doctrinal disputes.30 
It is this vitality in the pursuit of truth and the good that counters the perspectivist 
challenge and defines the purpose of special discourse. It often occurs through specific 
theological disputes between believers having “explicit commitment in foundations.”31 In 
other words, special discourse partners have some level of shared commitment to the 
truth claims of a single religious tradition or sometimes across traditions as evident in 
monotheistic traditions. The special insight or special revelation that occupies this mode 
of discourse “will be known to most people only through a link of tradition or culture that 
connects them with the original source.”32 Dhamma and God could therefore be defined 
as the final or constitutive truths that link these natural law traditions to a transcendent 
ground or unconditioned state. Special discourse in our natural law traditions is expressed 
in the context of Buddhadhamma and divine law. Again, I turn to the Pāli narrative and 
Theravāda scholars for delineating the Buddhadhamma. In the matter of Aquinas’s divine 
law, we will consider more in depth his distinction between the Old Law and the New 
Law. Not only does special discourse respond to the perspectivist challenge of pursuing 
the truth, but it is also the context from which discussion about natural law in these 
                                                 
29 Ibid. (1988), 360. 
30 Bodhi, 8. 
31 Lonergan (1972), 292. 
32 Adams, 100. 
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traditions is framed. It also allows the possibility of extending the measure of human 
dignity.  
 
Buddhadhamma 
The previous section on general discourse considered the law of kamma 
regulating the wheel of rebirth as the general knowledge available to all perceptive 
persons. This level of knowledge is often represented by the figure of the householder. I 
turn attention now to the highest level of insight, the Buddhadhamma, which is associated 
with Gotama Buddha and the arahant figure in the Pāli Canon. It receives this title 
because it was the level of insight that was penetrated by the Buddha during his 
enlightenment and later preached by him. The Buddhadhamma is the highest level of 
insight because it leads to the cessation (nirodha) of suffering, the fundamental problem 
of existence. It entails the complete vision of the Dhamma that is directly perceived when 
one realizes the truth of dependent origination (pattica-samuppāda).33 Consider how the 
Pāli Canon equates this doctrine with the fullness of Dhamma: “One who sees dependent 
origination sees the Dhamma, and one who sees the Dhamma sees dependent origination” 
(MN 28; I 190-91). 
Dependent origination refers to the law that is the most “difficult to perceive” of 
all conditioned phenomena: the arising and passing away of suffering by way of twelve 
interdependent factors that characterize samsāra (SN 12:1; II 1-2). The first six factors 
are associated with the arising of suffering and the last six are associated with the passing 
away of suffering. The doctrine of pattica-samuppāda as taught by the Buddha identifies 
ignorance (avijjā) as the primary factor through which all other factors arise in the wheel 
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of rebirth. Yet ignorance is not a singular cause or source in the sense of linear causality. 
Dependent origination illustrates the simultaneous arising of all phenomena, what Joanna 
Macy has referred to as a “mutual causality.”34 This doctrine structures the Theravādin 
cosmology of interdependence. The eventual uprooting of ignorance and all the other 
factors through direct insight (paññā) into the true nature of things is the only way to 
attain nibbāna.  
It is through this awareness of pattica-samuppāda that the third characteristic of 
existence, not-self (anattā), is fully understood. All phenomena, therefore, in light of this 
doctrine of interdependent co-arising, lack eternal substance or being (svabhāva).35 The 
human person, from this special insight, is comprised of five aggregates (khandhas) that 
make up an individual during a given life. Upon death, the components of the single 
person are disentangled and reintegrated with other components to comprise an entirely 
new person without any essential properties. In this view of interdependent “empty” 
persons, the Upanishadic doctrine of the permanent self (atman) is undermined. 
Moreover, in light of this special insight, the natural law of kamma and the truths of 
suffering and impermanence are revealed with the greatest of clarity and depth. 
We noted that the Buddha’s distinction between levels of insight or awareness 
into the Dhamma by referring to the mundane (lokiya) and the supramundane (lokuttara). 
The mundane or worldly level refers to actions, virtues, and meditations that can produce 
only pleasurable results and merit (puñña). The supramundane level, or world-
transcending path, refers to nine dimensions that lead to enlightenment: four paths 
(magga), four fruits of those paths (phala), and nibbāna. In the context of the 
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Buddhadhamma, these levels of awareness disappear because one’s direct realization of 
the fullness of Dhamma illuminates all other truths about reality.  
The ethical implications of special insight of Buddhadhamma are transformative. 
When the practitioner is in the proximity of nibbāna, she can truly behave in accord with 
the Dhamma and have a deeper engagement with the cessation of suffering for all living 
things.36 This higher insight, according to Reynolds, is framed within a Buddhic 
cosmology: “Ignorance is overcome by wisdom, craving is replaced by compassion, and 
the ongoing experience of suffering and impermanence gives way to liberation.”37 
Seeking refuge in the Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha, those on the way to enlightenment 
in this life devote themselves to the Eightfold Path to extinguish kamma and achieve the 
liberation that is enlightenment.  
 
Divine Law 
 As a result of the effects of sin on the natural law and its expression in bad 
customs, vices, and unjust human law, St. Thomas believed that God revealed the divine 
law (lex divina) in order to repair and transform the human heart. Therefore, the natural 
law is fully contained in the divine law. No discrepancy or incongruence exists between 
the two. Aquinas gives four reasons why this divine law was necessary (ST 1a2ae 91.4). 
The first reason is that humans have a supernatural vocation or ultimate end of eternal 
happiness (finem beatudinis aeternae) that only God can direct. Second, because of moral 
diversity, God offers a way of knowing what is good and what to avoid “without any 
doubt at all.” The third reason is that although human law intends to cultivate some 
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virtues, it is insufficient for cultivating all virtues, especially private ones. Finally, the 
divine law prevents any sin or evil deeds from going unnoticed and unpunished.  
Since the natural law only establishes general principles evident to everyone, the 
divine law was given to direct in “certain detailed matters” (ST 1a2ae 91.5 r3). Therefore, 
it is like human law, in the sense that it applies the general principles of the natural law to 
particular circumstances. The fundamental difference between human law and divine law 
has to do with teleological orientation. Whereas the end of human law is “that the State 
shall have tranquility in its temporal affairs,” the end of divine law is eternal happiness 
(ST 1a2ae 98.1).  
The divine law and its precepts that orient one toward this supernatural end are, as 
we mentioned, twofold. The twofold revelation of the divine law, for Aquinas, is 
analogous to the development from childhood to adulthood. The Old Law (lex vetus) 
given to the Jewish people, functions pedagogically to instruct the natural law. In this 
regard, it is like human law because it functions as an external principle of action. The 
moral precepts of the Old Law written in the Decalogue are in accord with reason and 
assist in the cultivation of virtues like justice. But its purpose was to prepare the Jewish 
people for the arrival of Jesus and the New Law. For this reason, Aquinas says the Old 
Law is good, but incomplete (ST 1a2ae 98.1). 
According to Aquinas, the fulfillment of humanity’s supernatural vocation is only 
possible through the New Law (lex nova), or the law of the Gospel (ST 1a2ae 106.1).38 
The work of Christ’s righteousness completes or perfects what the Old Law intends, 
which is the eternal happiness of union with God. Freedom or salvation from sinfulness is 
 
38 Cited in Hall, 68. 
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made possible through the New Law of Christ and the faith born from it. The New Law is 
delivered by the grace of the Holy Spirit that instructs humans about the twofold Gospel 
ethic to love God and love neighbor. Unlike the moral precepts of the Old Law that are 
external written commandments for ordering people toward justice and friendship with 
one another, the New Law of love is an interior prompting of grace that allows friendship 
with God. Therefore the New Law is like the natural law in the sense that it is an internal 
prompting.39 But instead of reason and desire as the prompting mechanism, the grace of 
the Spirit is what moves one to act. Grace is superadded to nature so that humans are able 
to attain friendship and union with God thus establishing a higher mode (altiori modo) of 
participating in the eternal law. 
A new order of virtues is accessible through the gift of grace. Aquinas refers to 
these as “infused” or theological virtues which are listed in St. Paul’s famous words to 
the church at Corinth: “And now faith, hope, and love abide, these three; and the greatest 
of these is love.”40 The supernatural virtues make it possible for those humans who 
possess them to be “good” (DQChar 2 r). The graced virtue of love or charity is the 
“mother” and “moving cause” of all the virtues (DQChar 3 riii). It unites us to God 
“through the actions of our intelligence and feelings” (DQChar 2.7) thereby establishing 
a connatural relationship with God that is the basis of divine friendship.   
 
 
39 Ibid. 
40 1 Cor 13.12 
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Chapter Four: “Nature” and the Hypergood 
 
 
 The term “nature” as a normative expression might appear trivial with the 
historicizing of natural law and designating it as a cultural construct. But this is not the 
case for the natural law traditions in question because nature is a necessary concept for 
ethical reflection. According to Novak, the ontological constitution of natural law is the 
work of theology whereas the ethical constitution of natural law is the work of 
philosophy. Since our approach is both religious and ethical, ontology and ethics 
designate this fundamental dimension of natural law to which we now turn, which is also 
inescapably metaethical.  
For the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions, “nature” is rooted in a constitutive 
truth or higher law that transcends all particularity. Nature itself is posited by the 
objective reality—the Dhamma and God—that precedes and extends beyond the human 
person. Buddhadasa cited this similarity between both traditions in the following manner: 
“Natural law governs creation and has power over it. In this sense dhamma functions as 
the Buddhist God” (my emphasis).1 Perhaps familiar with Aquinas, Buddhadasa 
acknowledged that Dhamma is like the eternal law of God in the sense that both govern 
the natural order of human beings. Therefore, harmony with Dhamma or participation in 
the eternal law is the proper orientation of nature.  
                                                 
1 Buddhadasa, 133. 
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It is in the context of “nature” from the level of special insight or revelation that 
the Dhamma and the eternal law provide an “infinite” or “empty” measure of all human 
acts. From the perspective of general knowledge, these natural law traditions claim that 
“justice” is the measure of human acts. In both traditions, justice refers to a kind of 
rendering of what is due. Concepts like fairness, equality, restitution, and retribution 
define the measure of justice. It is only from within the natural law traditions and the 
perspective of revelation and insight that an ultimate standard can be defended. 
When a natural law account removes this ultimate or transcendent measure of the 
human then it runs the risk of absolutizing nature. This is where natural law becomes 
dangerous and is susceptible to the homogenization of natural law discourse. Such a 
move is a form of ontological violence, which refers to a final or complete account of 
nature having been fully disclosed or defined. Ontological violence wedded with politics 
was evident, perhaps in the most extreme form, in Nazi Germany’s Aryan eugenics, but 
also in the constitutional history of the United States. The Dred Scott v. Sanford Supreme 
Court ruling of 1857, which Abraham Lincoln publicly opposed, declared that blacks 
were non-citizens or non-persons thereby depriving them of their “inalienable rights” and 
any legal protection from slavery.2 These two examples would have included both 
religious and secular proponents of ontological violence and terror. Hitler’s irreligious 
anti-Semitism coalesced with German Christian anti-Jewish nationalists. The fact is that 
terror can surface with little or no opposition in any society unable to measure itself 
against a higher law or transcendent order.  
 
2 Robert P. George, The Clash of Orthodoxies: Law, Religion, and Morality in Crisis (Wilmington, DE: ISI 
Books, 2001), 149. 
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I claimed that the natural law traditions in question overcome the temptation of 
ontological violence by identifying an ultimate measure as the constitutive truth that 
transcends or grounds reality. As a result, in light of the constitutive truth and the 
authoritative traditions that preserve it, “nature” is a revisable normative concept. It does 
not have the fixity or absoluteness that leads to ontological violence. To assure this, I 
restate that Dhamma is the “empty” measure of all things and the eternal law is the 
“infinite” measure of all persons.3 Because of these higher laws, nature also has, in a 
certain sense, directionality. The law of nature measured by emptiness and infinity has a 
teleological orientation that for both traditions ends in liberation or salvation. I refer to 
this teleological orientation as a “hypergood,” a concept borrowed from moral and 
political philosopher, Charles Taylor. It refers to those higher goods, “which not only are 
incomparably more important than others but provide the standpoint from which these 
must be weighed, judged, decided about.”4  
In our traditions, the hypergoods refer to the unconditioned awareness of 
enlightenment (nibbāna) and the perfected state of happiness (beatitudo). All other 
goods, or limited goods like virtuous actions, are seen as secondary, though perhaps 
necessary to achieving the hypergood in this life or the next. The truth or law that 
constitutes the hypergood is the “constitutive good.” Taylor defines the constitutive good 
as “the order of being or principle of that order.”5 We said earlier that the overriding good 
                                                 
3 I am echoing Fasching’s account of human dignity as an “unseen measure of the infinite” and Buddhism’s 
“emptiness” or “not-self” doctrine, but from a natural law perspective instead of the experience of the holy. 
See Darrell J. Fasching, The Ethical Challenge of Auschwitz and Hiroshima: Apocalypse or Utopia? 
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1993), 145-146. 
4 Taylor, 63. 
5 Ibid., 92. 
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or constitutive good is equal to the constitutive truth and higher law. Therefore, Dhamma 
and God constitute this teleological orientation of the moral life and religious quest.  
This model afforded by the natural law traditions can address one of the major 
ethical problems for natural law thinking since the Enlightenment: the separation of is-
ought. I concur with scholar Pamela Hall when she says that this separation “seems 
precisely inimical to any authentic doctrine of natural law.”6 Although she was referring 
to the Thomistic tradition, this can also apply to the Theravāda natural law tradition. Both 
traditions require congruence between the way things are and the way they ought to be. 
The protean term “nature” that is posited by the constitutive truth establishes normativity 
within these traditions. I noted that this ontological outlook is also inherently comparative 
in these traditions since moral truth is shared across traditions. I shall designate it as the 
“is” dimension of natural law thinking because it provides the ontological starting point 
of moral agency. 
 On the other hand, without the appropriate instruction from the source of truth, 
nature is incapable of achieving the aim. Nature points to the hypergood. As such, I 
designate the hypergood as the “ought” or ethical dimension of natural law thinking. The 
hypergoods are “a step to higher moral consciousness” and this undoubtedly means a 
deeper engagement with the world as a moral agent.7 Because these refer to the perfected 
state of happiness or unconditioned awareness of enlightenment in these traditions, they 
provide the content for an image of the good that orients nature toward its end. The 
hypergood represents what “ought” to be for the religious practitioner. In this model of 
natural law ethics, nature seeks the hypergood, or is ? ought. The higher law or 
                                                 
6 Hall, 18. 
7 Taylor, 64. 
84 
constitutive truth of Dhamma and the eternal law are the inspirational sources of the 
moral life that posit “nature,” but also give its proper orientation to the hypergood.  
 
Conditionality and Enlightenment  
The Theravāda tradition identifies “three characteristics of existence” (tilakkhana) 
that include suffering, impermanence, and not-self. They are, in other words, the truths 
that define the conditionality of all living things. Therefore, I identify “nature” as 
conditionality. Every person starts from this situation. Person, in Theravāda terms, refers 
to the five aggregates that comprise this particular existence. The task of the Buddhist 
practitioner is to penetrate these truths and recognize the law of nature governing this 
conditionality. The regulative justice of the law of kamma, as noted, is generally 
observable. With this mundane awareness, one is able to at most recognize the truths of 
suffering and impermanence. As a measure of justice, the law of kamma is purely 
retributive. It renders good and bad consequences determined by wholesome (kusala) and 
unwholesome (akusala) actions.  
The special insight of the Buddhadhamma, on the other hand, discloses another 
law the knowledge of which extinguishes the effects of kamma. This is the law of 
interdependence or dependent origination. It is a non-linear causal law that illuminates 
the conditions of the arising and passing away of suffering and impermanent phenomena. 
Moreover, the special experiential insight into dependent origination leads to a direct 
realization of the truth of not-self. Gotama Buddha taught, “What is nonself should be 
seen as it really is with correct wisdom thus: ‘This is not mine, this I am not, this is not 
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my self.’ When one sees this thus as it really is with correct wisdom, the mind becomes 
dispassionate and is liberated from the taints by nonclinging (SN 22:45; III 44-45).” 
As Buddhadasa put it, “all suffering arises from me and mine.”8 And what he 
meant by “me and mine” are the five aggregates (khandhas) deluded by wrong view, 
attachments, and clinging. Buddhadasa also stated that the perception of not-self is “the 
transcending of all kamma” thereby illustrating awareness of it as a higher level of 
insight.9 Penetrating this Buddhadhamma level of insight into the truth of not-self and the 
law of interdependent arising is synonymous with attaining enlightenment.  
That enlightenment can be designated as the hypergood is confirmed by the 
teaching: “The Buddhas declare that nibbāna is the supreme state (paramam)” (Dh 184). 
Damien Keown has also made great efforts to compare enlightenment in Buddhism with 
flourishing (eudaimonia) in Aristotle, both serving as the highest good (summum 
bonum).10 Although I would argue that this Buddhist-Aristotelian comparison is 
problematic,11 its point is well taken. According to Gotama Buddha, enlightenment is the 
destruction of the three cardinal vices: lust (rāga), hatred (dosa), and delusion (moha) 
(SN 38:1; IV 251-52). In the same Nikāya, the Buddha identifies thirty-three synonyms 
for what he refers to as “the unconditioned,” including terms like “the far shore,” “the 
sublime,” and “the deathless” (SN 43:1-44, combined; IV 359-373). The unconditioned is 
none other than enlightenment. It is the “destination” of those on the Eightfold Path 
(Ibid.).  
                                                 
8 See Buddhadasa, Chapter 5. 
9 Ibid., 135. 
10 See Keown (2001), Chapter 8. 
11 For example, Aristotle’s account eudaimonia is purely mundane, whereas the pursuit of enlightenment 
unfolds over countless lifetimes. This is why I prefer to use Taylor’s notion of hypergood, since it is more 
Platonic than Aristotelian in the sense that pursuit of the hypergood can transcend this world. 
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Although there might be a distinction between the kammic and nibbanic paths, the 
ultimate aim for both is enlightenment. Achieving this unconditioned awareness by 
experiential insight of the true Dhamma discloses the true measure of all things, 
emptiness (suññatā). Buddhadasa equates emptiness with the truth of not-self, saying it 
represents the “highest dhamma” and that it “makes a man immortal because it makes 
him free of the self idea.”12 The unconditioned or “empty” measure of all things is 
understood by those having penetrated the true Dhamma. In other words, there is no 
condition and there is no limit to the dignity of all living things. The empty measure 
provided by the true Dhamma thus surpasses the measure of retributive justice regulated 
by kamma. 
 
Reason and Happiness 
According to Jean Porter, a Thomistic scholar, Aquinas’s account of nature fits 
appropriately within his medieval scholastic context that understood “nature as reason.”13 
Reason, in most of the Western philosophical tradition, was seen as the defining 
characteristic of nature distinguishing humans from the lower animals. In the Summa, 
Thomas is in accord with this view when he claims that all operations or actions are the 
works of reason (ratio) and will (voluntas) and that the will is moved by appetite and 
commanded by reason (ST 1a2ae 91.2 r2). This is distinctively human agency that is 
ordered by reason.  
We noted earlier that reason is the analogous imprint of the imago dei, and being 
such, it contains the light of moral discernment. And this light that originates in God is 
                                                 
12 Buddhadasa, 135. 
13 Porter, 231-4. 
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none other than the natural law. Therefore, “the natural law is constituted through reason 
(per rationem constitutum)” (ST 1a2ae 94.1). “Nature” as reason, which contains the 
precepts of the natural law, provides the proper teleological orientation of human agency. 
Since all actions are for the sake of some end and that end is simultaneously a good one, 
the good that everyone seeks is felicity or happiness (felicitas vel beatitudo) (ST 1a2ae 
90.2 c1). The last end of the natural law that issues in happiness is, as we have noted, the 
common good. Achieving these goods is expressive of a flourishing, healthy society. It 
was also mentioned that human law, at its best, serves the purpose of securing these 
goods of society and individuals by properly guiding the orientation of natural law.  
The virtue that best promotes the common good, according to St. Thomas, is 
justice (justitia), which means “none other than to render to each his own” (ST 2a2ae 
58.11). This is not merely retributive justice, as is the case with punishing a criminal, but 
also includes restitution and fair distribution of social goods. Justice is perhaps the most 
important social virtue because it is the basis of a peaceful society by properly ordering 
all relationships. Moreover, justice is a virtue that is certainly attainable among those 
with general knowledge because “it is the only virtue of the will that can be acquired 
without grace.”14
Human law and the moral virtues of justice and prudence demonstrate the 
capacities of the natural law among those with general knowledge. For Aquinas, 
happiness can be achieved on this level, albeit an imperfect form (beatitudo imperfecta). 
The reality for Thomas is that no form of happiness achieved in this life is perfect. Not 
even that given by the divine law. But what the divine law offers, especially the New 
 
14 Porter, 204. 
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Law, is a higher mode (altiori modo) of participating in the eternal law, and therefore a 
more profound happiness, in this life. We noted that the Spirit of grace and charity 
transforms humans in such a way so that they can attain a deeper friendship with God. 
The perfect fulfillment of friendship or union with God is only available in the beatific 
vision of heaven. It is in this heavenly state that perfect happiness consists.  
Since God is love,15 the eternal law can be nothing other than the perfect 
expression of the law of love. This is why the New Law of Christ’s love is the highest 
expression of the eternal law. It offers a more fulfilling happiness than natural happiness. 
Participation in the eternal law by way of divine law initiates the standard of love as the 
new measure of human dignity and human acts as illustrated in the following statement 
by Aquinas: “For the uncreated law [the law of love] is the first standard and measure of 
our love” (DQChar 1.23). Aquinas is clear to point out that the infused virtue of charity 
that serves as our new standard “has no limit” (DQChar 2.13). Thus, reason is no longer 
bound to the limits of nature and natural justice because it is now opened to the infinite 
measure of love. This is the supernatural vocation of humanity offered by Christ that 
serves as the infinite measure of human dignity. 
 
 
15 1 John 4.8 
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Conclusion: Natural Law Ethics and Human Dignity 
 
 
Our investigation of natural law in the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions 
concludes with a shared horizon of a global neighborly ethic in view. This shared horizon 
locates commonalities with the neighbor as well as differences. In this ethic, the close 
proximity and distance of the neighbor hangs in balance. It is from this standpoint that the 
dignity of the neighbor can be protected. 
The distance or otherness of the neighbor is secured by the autonomy granted to 
her tradition. Any moral authoritarian attempt to swallow the neighbor’s tradition into its 
own is bad faith and not characteristic of these natural law traditions. That is because the 
neighbor’s tradition is guaranteed in theory to be, at minimum, open to the general 
knowledge upon which any revelation or special insight depends. Because of this 
autonomy of the neighbor’s tradition based on the view that they are “outside” of the 
tradition that receives the special insight or revelation, they may draw different moral 
conclusions regarding certain matters. Moral diversity is therefore a brute fact supported 
by the natural law traditions. 
On the other hand, the close proximity of the neighbor is always assumed because 
she shares a common humanity or “nature.” By having this common “nature,” her 
tradition is guaranteed the possibility of attaining at least general knowledge. We noted 
that this general knowledge, in the Theravāda and Thomistic traditions, is rooted in the 
law of kamma or the lex naturalis. General knowledge of these laws provides the basis 
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for rational assessments and discourse across traditions thus overcoming the relativist 
challenge. This is not to say that the neighbor’s tradition is incapable of knowing more 
than what is generally accessible. The aims of interreligious dialogue and even 
comparative theology enters here as an exciting prospect of locating deeper truths among 
traditions than basic moral truths. Therefore, recognizing ethical commonalities, sharing 
insights, and receiving mutual illumination are the fruits of maintaining the close 
proximity and otherness of the neighbor. 
By putting our two traditions in dialogue with each other, we can see the level of 
general discourse in operation. For example, we noted that Gotama Buddha recognized 
the importance and value of the Five Precepts (pañca-sīla). He declared that these 
teachings about what unwholesome actions should be avoided were ancient, traditional, 
and unadulterated precepts that preexisted his teaching. In other words, they were 
naturally accessible and valuable independent of the special insight of the 
Buddhadhamma. These precepts are meant to be the basis for purifying the three doors of 
kamma: body, speech, and mind. 
In the Thomistic tradition, Aquinas’s discussion of the Decalogue and the 
propaedeutic role of the divine law for natural law functions in a similar way to the Five 
Precepts. St. Thomas claims that although the Decalogue is divine law, its purpose in 
educating the natural law demonstrates that its precepts are accessible to all by virtue of 
natural reason. That is so because the natural law obliges all “to refrain from doing harm, 
whether by deed, word, or thought” to one’s neighbor (ST 1a2ae, 100). 
From this comparison of both traditions, we can locate ethical commonality on 
the precepts against lying, stealing, killing, and sexual misconduct. These shared precepts 
91 
                                                
constitute a minimum neighborly ethic. At its very least, natural law thinking can set the 
limits to fundamental norms of human dignity. At most, natural law thinking can stretch 
the limits of the human imagination for compassion, love, and interdependence. That is 
possible, after all, since truth is the measure of all warrants and if truth is “empty” or 
“infinite,” the possibilities for natural law ethics within a secular democratic context are 
more than promising. 
I conclude by stating that natural law traditions embodied in institutions like the 
sangha and the church have something essential to offer for the health of democratic 
societies. What is that? The answer comes from no greater example in than the Reverend 
Martin Luther King, Jr., who wrote the following in his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail”: 
[…] there are two types of laws: there are just and there are unjust laws… Now 
what is the difference between the two? How does one determine when a law is 
just or unjust? A just law is a man-made code that squares away with the moral 
law or law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral 
law. To put it in terms of Saint Thomas Aquinas, an unjust law is a human law 
that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law.1  
 
Notice that Reverend King did not say that an unjust law is a human law not 
rooted in divine law. He mentioned only the eternal law and the natural law. That is 
because he recognized the autonomy and dignity of natural law, but also the sovereignty 
of God. From a natural law perspective, we ought to be in harmony with eternal law, and 
respectively, with Dhamma. As evident, the natural law traditions claim that some form 
of harmony through participation in the eternal law or understanding of Dhamma is 
possible in other traditions. But through the divine law and the Buddhadhamma, one is 
able to participate in the eternal law in a higher mode or understand the fullness of 
 
1 Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” I Have a Dream: Writings and Speeches that 
Changed the World, ed. James Melvin Washington (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), 89. 
92 
Dhamma leading to liberation in this life. From the revelation or special insight of a 
natural law perspective, the natural law within us should be the “infinite measure” or 
“empty measure” of our human laws. In the Thomistic tradition, we have seen that the 
“infinite measure” refers to the eternal law that cannot be fully comprehended, which is 
the uncreated law of love. For Theravāda Buddhism, the “empty measure” refers to the 
law of interdependence and the law of emptiness or not-self.  
These natural law traditions therefore respect the autonomy of other traditions, 
promote discourse, and contain the resources for defending human dignity. These natural 
law traditions place no limit on human dignity and no limit on taking care of creation or 
the existence of all living things because all human laws are measured by infinity or 
emptiness. As such, there is no limit to how good one can be. Simultaneously, natural law 
thinking recognizes that there is a limit on how bad one should be. Those shared moral 
precepts stated earlier serve as an illustration of this limit.  
Natural law thinking, therefore, does have something essential to offer a 
democratic society: it can evoke the audacity to challenge any unjust human law, no 
matter who institutes it. As Novak puts it, “Natural law, then, is the necessary and 
perpetual critique needed by all culture and all positive law, even by that culture whose 
adherents are still conscious of its origin in revelation.2 This is the perennial promise of 
natural law ethics in a world of neighbors. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Novak (1998), 193. 
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